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ACTIVIST DIRECTORS AND AGENCY COSTS:
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN AN ACTIVIST
DIRECTOR GOES ON THE BOARD?
John C. Coffee, Jr., Robert J. Jackson, Jr.,
Joshua R. Mitts & Robert E. Bishop†
We develop and apply a new and more rigorous
methodology by which to measure and understand both
informed trading and the agency costs of hedge fund
activism. We use quanti-tative data to show a systematic
relationship between the appointment of a hedge fundnominated director to a corporate board and an increase in
informed trading in that corpora-tion’s stock (with the
relationship being most pronounced when the fund’s slate
of directors includes a hedge fund em-ployee). This finding
is important from two different perspec-tives. First, from a
governance perspective, activist hedge funds represent a
new and potent force in corporate govern-ance. A robust
debate continues as to whether activist funds reduce the
agency costs of corporate governance, but this is the first
attempt to investigate whether activist hedge funds also
impose new agency costs through widened bid-ask
spreads and informed trading. Second, although insider trading is almost universally condemned, it has only been studied
in individual cases. Using instead a quantitative approach,
we develop a tool that enables regulators (civil and criminal) to
identify suspicious trading patterns: both to demonstrate
such a pattern and to map these new agency costs, we assembled a data set of 475 settlement agreements, between target
companies and activist funds relating to the appointment of
† John C. Coffee, Jr. is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia Law
School. Robert J. Jackson, Jr. is a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Joshua R. Mitts is an Associate Professor of Law at Columbia Law
School. Robert E. Bishop is a doctoral student at the Yale School of Management.
Commissioner Jackson completed his work on this Article prior to joining the
Commission. This Article expresses only Commissioner Jackson’s views and does
not necessarily reflect those of the Commission, the other Commissioners, or the
SEC staff. The SEC disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement of any SEC employee or Commissioner. We are grateful to Lucian Bebchuk,
Bernard Black, Emiliano Catan, Albert Choi, Jeffrey Gordon, Colleen Honigsberg,
Charles Jones, Darius Palia, Alex Raskolnikov, Eric Talley, and workshop participants at Columbia and NYU for helpful comments and suggestions and to the
Columbia Law School for generous financial support. We also wish to thank our
two research assistants, Maya Ben Meir and Serdar Inci, both L.L.M. students at
Columbia Law School, for their hard work on data coding and legal research.
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fund-nominated directors, from 2000 to 2015, in order to focus
on what happens once such a fund-nominated director goes
on the board.
Among our principal findings are:
1. Prevalence of Hedge Fund Employees on Slates. Approximately 70% of fund-nominated director slates
include a hedge fund employee.
2. Increase in Information Leakage. Once a fund-nominated director goes on the board, an abrupt increase in “information leakage” follows, with the
result that the target corporation’s stock price begins to anticipate future public disclosures. Specifically, we examine some 635,450 Form 8-K’s filed
by 7,799 publicly traded companies over the period
of January 1, 2000 to September 30, 2016, and we
construct a control group for each of the corporations subject to an activist intervention. We find
that firms appointing an activist nominee or nominees experience a difference-in-differences increase
in leakage of twenty-five to twenty-seven percentage
points.
3. Hedge Funds Versus Other Activists. We next consider whether post-appointment increases in leakage depend on the identity of the activist investors
(i.e., hedge fund versus other activist investors). We
find that the leakage effect is clearly driven by
hedge fund activists (and no other type of activist).
4. Leakage and Hedge Fund Employees. We investigate whether leakage increases depend on the identity of the director appointed to the target firm’s
board, distinguishing between hedge fund employees and non-hedge fund employees. We find that
the increase in leakage is driven by the appointment of activist fund employees to the corporate
board (and not by the appointment of other persons, such as industry professionals).
5. Leakage and Confidentiality Provisions. We consider whether post-settlement increases in leakage
are associated with confidentiality provisions restricting information sharing in the settlement
agreements. The majority of settlement agreements
have no confidentiality provisions, and information
leakage is concentrated in these cases.
6. Market Response to Settlement Agreements. We
next examine whether the stock market’s response
to settlement agreements depends on (a) whether a
hedge fund employee is on the director slate, and (b)
whether the settlement agreement contains or re-
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fers to a confidentiality provision. We find that the
five day CAR is more than twice as high (4.2% vs.
1.97%) for settlements with only non-employee directors and also significantly higher (2.02% vs.
0.42%) for settlements with an explicit restriction
on information sharing.
Effect on Bid-Ask Spread. Bid-ask spreads increase
by statistically meaningful amounts in our treatment group after an activist director gains access to
the boardroom. Bid-ask spreads do not widen for
the control groups. Further, we find that the increases in bid-ask spreads are concentrated in
those cases in which (i) a hedge fund employee is
appointed to the board, or (ii) no confidentiality provision is referenced in the settlement agreement.
Options Trading. We find that options trading increases significantly after the appointment of an activist director and in a manner consistent with
informed trading. Consistent with earlier research
on informed trading, we find that options traders
focus on unscheduled Form 8-K filings.
Implications. The foregoing pattern is most plausibly explained as the product of informed trading.
Material, nonpublic information appears to be incorporated into the market price prior to public disclosure. We reach no conclusions about who is
trading or its legality in any individual case. Yet,
the widened bid-ask spread strongly suggests that
the market expects such trading, and the much
more positive market response to director slates
without a hedge fund employee (or with a confidentiality provision) suggests that the market suspects
that informed trading is closely associated with the
appointment of a hedge fund employee to the board.
Hypothesis. Our data suggests that the ability to
engage in informed trading may serve as a subsidy
that inflates the rate of hedge fund activism (producing more engagements than if stronger controls
on information sharing were imposed) and may
even encourage activists to pursue inefficient engagements. Further, a potential beneficiary of this
informed trading may be the “wolf-pack” of activists
that follow the lead activist in the engagement. But
we stop short of attempting to estimate the size of
such impacts.
Reforms. We consider and evaluate a variety of possible reforms that are consistent with an energetic
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role for hedge fund activism, but that remove (to
various degrees) the subsidy of informed trading.
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INTRODUCTION
Hedge fund activism has dramatically reshaped corporate
governance—arguably revolutionizing it. Almost everyone
agrees with this assessment, but they disagree over whether
this change is for the better or the worse. An intense and
continuing debate has surrounded whether interventions by
activist hedge funds enhance shareholder value or only create
short-term pressures that compel corporate managers to sacrifice long-term performance.1 This Article, however, will not
attempt to replough this much-ploughed furrow.
1
Consensus exists only on the common finding that a filing with the SEC
(usually of a Schedule 13D) that announces an activist’s position in a publicly
held company is associated with a positive abnormal stock return. See Alon Brav
et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J.
FIN. 1729, 1736–37 (2008). Beyond this point, most empirical conclusions about
activism are contested. There is some dispute whether this initial stock price
bump fades when no transaction subsequently materializes. However, Bebchuk
and others examined the performance of approximately 2,000 activist targets over
the five years following these activist’s intervention and find no evidence that the
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Instead, our starting point is that, in this new landscape of
corporate governance, the activist hedge fund has become the
key intermediary.2 But, as new agents arise, so do new agency
costs. This is definitional.3 Unless the interests of the agent
and the agent’s principal are perfectly aligned, this new agent
will find ways to exercise its discretion opportunistically and in
its own interests. Thus, this Article’s primary goal is to map
these new agency costs arising from hedge fund activism. We
attempt to do so by using a statistically more rigorous methodology than has previously been applied to either corporate govinitial stock price gain fades. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The
Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2015).
Nonetheless, Cremers and others contend that Bebchuk’s findings are largely the
product of selection bias and the failure to use a proper control group. They
contend that, once control groups are used, a regression to the mean can be seen
in the subsequent performance of activist targets. See K.J. Martijn Cremers et al.,
Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Value, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2693231
[https://perma.cc/DRZ4-CFBS] (Dec. 19, 2018). Other scholars have rejected the
methodology used in those studies finding that activism results in increases in
shareholder value and reported that, under their revised approach, the long-term
returns to activism are “insignificantly different from zero.” See Ed deHaan, David
F. Larcker, and Charles McClure, Long Term Economic Consequences of Hedge
Fund Activist Interventions, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3260095 (Oct. 3, 2018).
This Article takes no position on this continuing dispute. Many have also raised
the claim that short-term pressures compel managers to abandon long-term investments, particularly in research and development, that would have proven
profitable, with the result that activism thus produces a negative externality in
reduced aggregate investment in research and development. See John C. Coffee,
Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on
Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 545 (2016); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who
Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund
Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870,
1870 (2017). But again, others contend that despite declines in research and
development expenditures following activist interventions, target companies
nonetheless experience an improvement in innovation efficiency as measured by
patent counts and citations. See Alon Brav et al., How Does Hedge Fund Activism
Reshape Corporate Innovation?, 130 J. FIN. ECON. 237, 237 (2018).
2
See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordan, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 863, 863 (2013).
3
The term “agency costs,” first defined by Jensen and Meckling, refers to the
costs that arise because of the use by a principal of an agent. These costs include
(1) the costs of opportunistic behavior by the agent (such as when the agent places
his own self-interest over that of the principal); (2) the costs to the principal of
monitoring the agent; and (3) the “bonding” costs incurred by the agent to induce
the principal to rely on the agent. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). Others have coined the term “principal costs” to
refer to costs imposed on the corporate entity by the principal, such as where
there is inter-shareholder conflict. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal
Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767,
767 (2017). This is applicable here also, as the other shareholders may object
that decisions by the lead activist were self-interested.
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ernance or white collar crime, which, we hope, will serve as a
model for future research in these areas.
Three recent developments (on which this Article will focus)
suggest that agency costs are significant and increasing. First,
hedge funds are succeeding in placing their nominees on corporate boards, and in 2016, netted a record 131 board seats for
their nominees.4 Second, the vast majority of these seats were
resolved through private agreements (and without a shareholder vote), and the largest and most sophisticated institutional investors have begun to complain that this private
settlement process effectively disenfranchises them.5 These
objectors characteristically differ from the activist fund that
initiates the campaign in that they are much larger, more diversified (often highly indexed), and have a substantially longer
time horizon. Thus, an important issue is whether the new
private settlement process infringes basic norms of shareholder democracy.
Third, in the course of studying this private settlement
process, we assembled a data set of 475 private settlement
agreements, extending from January 1, 2000 to December 31,
2015. Analyzing these agreements, we discovered a previously
unnoticed pattern: when an activist-nominated director or di4
In 2016, activists ran some 149 campaigns to secure board representation
and netted a record 131 board seats. LAZARD, REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN
2016, at 1 (2017) [hereinafter LAZARD (2016)]. In 2017, the number of seats won
fell to 100, but the number of campaigns rose to 193 and the amount of capital
invested by activists soared to a record $62 billion, as activists took on much
larger companies. See LAZARD’S SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY GROUP, 2017 ACTIVISM YEAR
IN REVIEW, at 1, 5 [hereinafter LAZARD (2017)]. Most recently, in the first quarter of
2018, 73 new campaigns were initiated by activists (the highest quarterly level of
activity “on record” according to Lazard), and some 65 board seats were won in the
first quarter of 2018 (which was “well ahead” of comparable periods in 2016 and
2017). See LAZARD SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY GROUP, REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
– Q1 2018, at 1 [hereinafter LAZARD (2018)]. By all measures, activism is surging.
5
The three largest institutional shareholders are BlackRock, Inc., State
Street Global Advisors, and Vanguard, which collectively hold 18.4% of the stock
of companies in the S&P 500 index. LAZARD (2018), supra note 4, at 8. Each of
these three institutions is highly diversified and tends to be a “permanent shareholder,” thus differing from activist hedge funds that hold shares for shorter
periods. Each has repeatedly objected in letters to the CEOs of major corporations about the short-term vision of activist hedge funds. See infra notes 93–97
and accompanying text. They have also contended that private settlements between the activist fund and corporate management exclude them from any meaningful voice in the selection of the board. For the fullest statement of this view, see
Protecting Long-Term Shareholder Interests in Activist Engagements, STATE STREET
GLOBAL ADVISORS (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2016/Protecting-Long-Term-Shareholder-Interests-in-Activist-Engagements.pdf [https://perma.cc/SAJ7-N3RV]. For a fuller
explanation of their critique, see infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
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rectors goes on a target corporation’s board pursuant to a settlement agreement, a pattern of “information leakage” begins.
That is, after such a director is appointed (or even given observer status at board meetings), the stock price of the target
corporation begins to anticipate future public disclosures,
moving up or down prior to (but in the same direction as that
caused by) the eventual public disclosure. Similarly, the bidask spread in the corporation’s stock price widens—both in
relation to the stock’s prior history and to a control group of
similar firms. We also find a significant pattern of options trading in advance of new announcements by the target corporation on Form 8-K. The most plausible explanation for this
pattern is informed trading. Somehow, material, nonpublic information is being incorporated into the stock’s price, and the
widened spread reflects the market’s anticipation of informed
trading (which causes experienced traders to widen their
spreads defensively). Whether or not this informed trading is
unlawful, it represents an agency cost that the other shareholders bear.
To underscore the importance of both these findings (that
private settlement agreements may be preempting shareholder
elections and that informed trading seems to increase in the
wake of activist interventions), one should understand that, in
2016, activists won a record number of board seats, but 95% of
these seats were obtained through private settlement negotiations, not proxy contests.6
At present, most of the academic literature on hedge fund
activism tends to reflect an optimistic view under which activists are seen as desirable agents of change, who intentionally
invest in underperforming companies to organize the other
shareholders to support their proposals (which usually seek to
increase leverage and shareholder payout, trim waste, and/or
change senior management).7 So viewed, the process may
seem a model of shareholder democracy, as the activists make
proposals, managements respond, and the balance of the
shareholders (who are largely sophisticated institutional inves6
LAZARD (2016), supra note 4, at 1. This 95% figure is in sharp contrast to
the earlier pattern. Two years earlier, in 2014, 34% of the board seats won by
activists were won in actual proxy contests, not private settlements. Id. Thus, the
shift towards private settlements is accelerating. In 2017, this rate fell to 86%
(i.e., 86 of the 100 seats won that year were as the result of private settlements).
LAZARD (2017), supra note 4, at 5.
7
For this view, see Gilson & Gordon, supra note 2, at 876 (emphasizing that
institutional investors, without the leadership of the activist fund, would remain
passive and silent).
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tors) decide the issue. From this perspective, the result is governance by referendum, with a well-informed debate, followed
by a vote. All that is new here is the appearance of an entrepreneurial intermediary (the activist hedge fund), who
searches for underperforming companies, makes proposals,
and lobbies the other shareholders, who hold the balance of
power, to act in their mutual self-interest.
But a more skeptical view of activism may be necessary
because the process does not actually work this simply.8 In
reality, there are relatively few shareholder votes on activists’
proposals or director nominees. Instead, the activists and
management typically settle their disputes through private negotiations, with the activists sometimes receiving private benefits not available to the other shareholders.9 Why does
management settle rather than fight (and thus let all shareholders decide)? Our answer is that the CEO’s job is imperiled,
unless he or she settles.10 With its human capital locked into
the company, senior management of a company “engaged” by
activists has every reason to behave in a risk-averse fashion.
Additionally, drawn-out proxy fights introduce uncertainty into
the company and divert managerial time. For both reasons,
the vast majority of the directors placed on the board as the
result of activist pressure is appointed through privately negotiated settlements, thus allowing management to avoid the risk
of a proxy contest.11 Large institutional investors have begun
to object vocally to this private settlement process.12 Regarding
themselves as the company’s “permanent shareholders,” these
institutions assert that de facto power has shifted to short-term
activists who often have a distinctly different agenda from
theirs.
8

For such a more skeptical view, see Coffee & Palia, supra note 1, at 562–68.
See infra subpart II.A.
10
Lazard’s Shareholder Advisory Group reports that, since 2013, annualized
CEO turnover at activist targets has averaged 23% compared to 12% for nontargets. LAZARD’S SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY GROUP, REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM—3Q 2017, at 1 (2017). For the even higher rate of turnover if activist nominees go onto the board, see infra note 47 and accompanying text (reporting study
by FTI Consulting showing that the CEO turnover rate rises to 55.1% over two
years if activists place one or more nominees on the board). Further evidence of
management’s risk aversion lies in the fact that when there actually is a proxy
contest, management usually wins. In 2016, Lazard found that activists won in
only 38% of proxy contests. LAZARD (2016), supra note 4, at 1. This suggests that
management prefers to settle, except in cases where it is highly confident that it
can win.
11
See LAZARD (2018), supra note 4, at 1.
12
See infra notes 90–95 and accompanying text.
9
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Viewed from this perspective, one does not see the simple
democracy of the Swiss canton, but instead a process of
backroom deal-making reminiscent of a political “machine.”
The distance between these two perspectives largely turns on
whether private settlements may result in different outcomes
than shareholder elections do.
These twin concerns—the impact of activist interventions
on shareholder democracy and the pervasiveness of informed
trading once an activist goes on the board—may seem unrelated, but they are both examples of agency costs. We believe
these costs are significant and that they have not yet been
seriously examined. Still, we must emphasize at the outset
that we do not assert that shareholder activism is fatally
flawed, and we believe feasible reforms are easily within reach.
Nor do we doubt that rational investors will often want insurgents (including hedge fund activists) to challenge corporate
managements. All that we insist is that the loyalty of this new
activist agent cannot be automatically assumed.
In this light, two other findings of our study need to be
emphasized. First, we find that the stock price pattern from
which we detect information leakage and widened bid-ask
spreads is particularly pronounced in cases where one of the
activist-nominated directors is a hedge fund employee. Put
more simply, increases in information leakage occur more often
and to a greater degree at companies where a hedge fund employee, rather than a former industry executive, joins the
board. This seems plausible because hedge fund employees
live in a world of traders (and thus have more opportunities to
pass such information, either by way of a quid pro quo exchange or in casual gossip).
Second, we find that there is also a strong relationship
between this pattern of information leakage and whether the
private settlement agreement seriously attempts to restrict the
use of confidential information acquired by the activist-nominated directors. Most agreements are in fact silent on this
point, and others seem to tacitly permit information sharing.13
These findings lead us to advance three hypotheses. First,
the ability to engage in informed trading based on access to
material, nonpublic information may provide a subsidy to
hedge fund activism. By definition, a subsidy increases the
volume or level of the activity subsidized. Here, that means
that, on the margin, there may be more activist “engagements”
13

See infra notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
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and more activist-appointed directors under a system that enables activists to gain access to nonpublic information than
under one that more closely restricts such access. Second,
providing access to such information may be the social cement
that holds together a loose coalition of hedge funds (popularly
called a “wolf pack”) that supports the lead activist’s efforts to
compel corporate managements to accept its proposals. Third,
activist engagements that propose an inefficient (or at least
highly debatable) change in the target’s business model may
still succeed (or at least capture board seats) because of the
desire of these allies of the activist to continue to receive access
to material, nonpublic information in return for their support
(even if they doubt the wisdom of the lead activist’s specific
proposal). In short, the corporation risks inefficient changes in
its policies or business model when the activist can reward its
allies with access to material, nonpublic information. We emphasize that these are hypotheses, not findings, and they will
be elaborated and defended in more detail later in this Article.
In fairness, one qualification is necessary at the outset: we
do not assert that any specific persons—activist-appointed directors, hedge fund employees, or allies in other hedge funds—
have engaged in unlawful insider trading. Inferences of illegality cannot be drawn from our data, standing alone. But it is
clear that informed trading has occurred and someone is benefitting. In any event, even if the sharing of material, nonpublic
information among investment professionals were not illegal, it
would still represent an agency cost for investors and a perverse subsidy for activism that distorts the capital markets.
In this Article, we present empirical evidence of the presence of these agency costs. Using a novel database of 475
settlement agreements between activists and target companies
over a fifteen-year period, we systematically study activist settlements and the directors appointed pursuant to those agreements.14 Our study differs from other studies in several ways.
First, we consider settlement agreements through the end of
2015. The period 2011–2015 saw a substantial increase in the
number of settlements with activist investors, and the first
14
We are not the first to study settlement agreements with activist investors,
but we are the first to examine closely the market reaction to them and to special
characteristics of these arguments. For an earlier study, see Lucian A. Bebchuk
et al., Dancing with Activists, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2948869 [https://
perma.cc/P2NR-XNRB] (Last modified Nov. 27, 2017). They focus on the effect of
these agreements on the target firm’s governance, including board turnover, CEO
turnout, payout policy and operational performance.
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public criticisms by diversified institutional investors of activist
behavior.
Second, we identify some critical factors in settlement
agreements that have not previously been examined (or even
noticed). In particular, we compare the five-day cumulative
abnormal return (“CAR”) to settlements with and without at
least one hedge fund employee being added to the board of
directors pursuant to the agreement. The average five-day CAR
is more than twice as high (4.2% vs. 1.9%) for settlements with
only non-employee directors,15 and this is consistent with our
findings (described below) about possible agency costs of having hedge fund employees on the board. Similarly, the average
five-day CAR is several times higher (2.2% vs. 0.42%) for settlements with an explicit rule on information sharing in either the
settlement agreement itself or a separate confidentiality agreement.16 That activists continue to place hedge fund employees
on boards and to resist rules on information sharing against
the market’s strong preference suggests that some stronger
motivation leads activist funds to disregard the market’s
preference.
To summarize, our main empirical finding is that the appointment of fund-nominated directors causes material information regarding the firm and its operations to become more
“leaky”; that is, more of that information makes its way into the
company’s stock price prior to the public disclosure of that
information than in the case of our control group of similarlysituated firms.17 The increased leakiness is strongly associated with the appointment of directors who are also employees
of the activist investor as opposed to the industry experts typically appointed to the target’s board pursuant to an activist
settlement. Moreover, leakage is concentrated in settlements
without any explicit rule on information sharing in either the
settlement agreement itself or a separate confidentiality agreement. We show that bid-ask spreads grow significantly as a
result of the appointment of these kinds of activist directors,
providing further evidence as to the agency cost inherent in
these settlements.18
15

See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
17
As we show formally in the Theoretical Appendix, the pattern of this leakage follows dynamic behavioral models of criminal wrongdoing: that is, the magnitude of our leakage finding decreases over time, as the probability of detecting
trading on leaked information increases.
18
See infra subpart II.G. For a review of the literature describing previous
empirical work documenting the benefits associated with hedge fund activism, see
16
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None of this implies that hedge fund activism is inherently
corrupt or misguided. But to the extent that hedge fund activists present themselves as the champion of all the shareholders, there may be a need for greater oversight of this imperfect
champion.
A roadmap for this Article is now in order. After this introduction, this Article will examine in Part I the private settlement process surrounding hedge fund “engagements” to show
how it differs from a simple democratic model. Part II will then
turn to an empirical study of the potential agency costs that are
inherent in this new process. Again, this mapping is undertaken not to demonstrate that the shareholder activist must be
deterred, but more to suggest where greater controls and transparency are needed. Then, Part III will turn to potential reforms. Here, two issues stand out: (1) Should other
shareholders be enabled to participate in, or object to, these
private settlements when they substantially change the composition of the board? and (2) How can the agency costs associated with this new activism best be minimized? This Article will
then offer some conclusions.

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson Jr., The Law and Economics of
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 40 (2012). We acknowledge that we
are not the first to examine the implications of activist shareholders’ access to
material nonpublic information. Collin-Dufresne and Fos use an extensive
dataset of trades in the target company’s stock before the activist’s presence is
disclosed to consider whether standard measures of adverse selection reflect such
trading. See Pierre Collin-Dufresne & Vyacheslav Fos, Moral Hazard, Informed
Trading, and Stock Prices, (THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Working
Paper 19619, Nov. 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19619 [https://
perma.cc/6SZV-J9BL]. But that is a very different focus than ours. Federal law
requires activists to disclose their stakes to the public within ten days of acquiring
greater than 5% ownership of any class of the target company’s stock. As one of
us has shown in previous work, activists often use a substantial amount of this
ten-day window before disclosing their stake. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., PreDisclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L.
1, 23 (2013). In the Collin-Dufresne and Fos study, the activist’s presence, itself,
was the relevant material nonpublic information. Here, we examine the effects of
the appointment of activist directors on how fundamental information about a
material corporate event makes its way into stock prices after the activist’s intervention. We note that in the setting in Collin-Dufresne and Fos, the activist
creates the information—that is, the activist’s own intervention. By contrast, in
our setting, the material corporate event occurs exogenously, and the activist and
associated traders profit from information created by (and arguably misappropriated from) the corporate issuer.
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I
BACKGROUND AND THEORY
This Article’s focus on the agency costs of hedge fund activism draws upon a new scholarly literature that has distinguished “vertical” agency costs from “horizontal” agency
costs.19 The classic “vertical” costs were those associated with
holding management accountable. But, as scholars studying
venture capital have noted, conflicts can also arise among different groups of shareholders who acquired their stock at different times and with different rights. Some shareholders may
be able to act opportunistically with respect to the others. Similarly, as the “vertical” agency costs of corporate governance are
minimized and management is made more accountable, activists at public corporations may increasingly be able to act opportunistically with respect to two other groups: (1) Other
shareholders who (for various reasons) have traditionally been
passive and (2) Stakeholders (in particular, creditors and employees). In particular, this Article will assert that a “horizontal” conflict has arisen between activists (who tend to be shortterm shareholders) and indexed institutional investors (who
tend to be long-term investors and regard themselves as the
company’s “permanent shareholders”).
As this conflict intensifies, the role of management
changes. In the past, managements and boards of directors at
public companies have professed that their core responsibility
was to balance the interests of all stakeholders.20 The larger
the company, the more likely that its management would take
such a stance. But this balancing (to the extent that it in fact
19
See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False
Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 42–45 (2006); Simone M. Sepe,
Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Contracts, 36 J. CORP. L. 113, 129 (2010).
This concept is similar to the idea of “principal costs” developed by Professors
Goshen and Squire. See Goshen & Squire, supra note 3, at 767. For our purposes, differences in nomenclature are not important.
20
Margaret Blair has correctly observed that: “Throughout the middle of the
twentieth century through at least the 1970s, most scholars of corporate law, as
well as legal and business practitioners, accepted and were comfortable with the
idea that boards of directors have to play a balancing role.” Margaret M. Blair,
Boards of Directors as Mediating Hierarchs, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 297, 315 (2015).
Indeed, in 1981, the Business Roundtable published a “Statement on Corporate
Responsibility” that insisted that boards were obligated to balance “different constituent interests.” See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 75 (1981). See also Harwell Wells, ‘Corporation Law is Dead’: Heroic
Managerialism, the Cold War, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of
the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 305, 325–23 (2013) (discussing management’s seemingly public role, and responsibilities to various stakeholders,
including stockholders, employees, and customers).
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occurred) may have been at least partially a product of high
agency costs that sheltered management from shareholder
pressure. Once that protection is removed and management
loses the discretion it once had, management and the board
may come under greater pressure to transfer wealth from creditors and employees to shareholders. Indeed, abundant evidence exists that hedge fund activism has cost creditors
significantly and systematically.21 In addition, some evidence
suggests that shareholder pressure, organized and directed by
activist hedge funds, may cause the corporation to act in a
more risk-accepting manner and contrary to broadly accepted
public policies.22 As a result, the tendency to view activists
automatically as the “good” guys, and management as the

21
See, e.g., Surendranath Jory, Thanh Ngo & Jurica Susnjara, The Effect of
Shareholder Activism on Bondholders and Stockholders, 66 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN.
328, 328 (2017) (finding that “activists’ demands cause a significant decline in
bond returns, and affect long-term bonds the most”); Felix Zhiyu Feng, Qiping Xu
& Heqing Zhu, Caught in the Crossfire: How the Threat of Hedge Fund Activism
Affects Creditors, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=271
6929 [https://perma.cc/RRX4-BC7G] (last modified Aug. 20, 2018) (observing
that in threatened industries, firms with an ex ante high likelihood of hedge fund
activism experience significant losses in bondholder wealth); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target Firm’s Existing Bondholders, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1735, 1735 (2011) (finding that the bond returns from
ten days before to one day after the filing of a 13D are negative (-3.9%), that the
average abnormal bond returns for one year after the filing date are an additional 4.5%, and that the abnormal stock returns are negatively related to the abnormal
bond returns at both the short-term and long-term intervals).
22
To give just two examples, there is evidence that hedge fund activism is (1)
negatively affecting board diversity and resulting in less women and minorities
serving on boards, and (2) compelling some energy companies to use “dirty” energy and shelve projects to shift to “clean” energy. For the impact on diversity, see
Andrew Borek, Zachary Friesner & Patrick McGurn, The Impact of Shareholder
Activism on Board Refreshment Trends at S&P 1500 Firms, IRRC INST., https://
irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/FINAL-Activism-and-Board-Refreshment-Trends-Report-Aug-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6ZB-PS94] (detailing a study by the ISS and the IRRC). With respect to the impact on the
environment, the best example is the campaign led in 2017 by Elliott Management, a prominent hedge fund, to force NRG Energy, Inc., the nation’s secondlargest electricity producer, to dispose of its renewable energy assets (basically
solar and wind power assets) and return to the use of coal (which was cheaper).
See Ed Crooks, Activists Clash Over Direction for NRG Energy, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 4,
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/89417ba2-1d3e-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9
[https://perma.cc/96UK-75SU]; Diane Cardwell & Alexandra Stevenson, NRG, a
Power Company Leaning Green, Faces Activist Challenge, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/business/dealbook/nrg-elliottmanagement-climate.html [https://perma.cc/A7HK-48YJ]. Eventually, NRG
gave in, sold its renewable energy assets, and returned to “dirty” energy. See
Russell Gold, NRG to Sell Assets, Slash Costs, Bowing to Activist Pressure, WALL
ST. J. (July 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nrg-to-sell-assets-slashcosts-bowing-to-activist-pressure-1499868712 [https://perma.cc/VUD9-2SPD].
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“bad” guys, when a conflict between them arises, is becoming
increasingly dated.
A.

The Private Settlement Process

Democracy relies on voting. But shareholder democracy
today turns on private negotiations between activists and management. To illustrate, in 2016, Lazard counted some 149
campaigns initiated by activist shareholders in that year to
obtain board representation, and it found that these campaigns had won a record of 131 board seats in 2016.23 But
95% of these seats were obtained through settlement negotiations.24 In the relatively few cases that did go to a shareholder
vote, management generally won,25 suggesting that management settled whenever they saw a serious risk of losing and
contested the activists’ demands only when management was
confident of victory (or could not strike an acceptable deal).
Another study by the State Street Global Advisors
(“SSGA”), a major institutional money manager, confirms Lazard’s findings. Surveying companies with market capitalizations above $500 million (i.e., mid-sized companies and up),
SSGA finds that less than 10% of the board seats conceded in
both 2015 and 2016 shifted through a contested proxy election.26 Instead, private negotiations dominated, and this trend
is increasing. SSGA finds that, in 2014, 34% of board seats
won by activists were obtained through actual proxy elections,
which is in marked contrast to the 10% rate in 2016 and implies that in the recent past, management was more prepared
than today to fight a proxy contest.27 Put simply, management
today seems increasingly risk averse, probably because a defeat in an election contest might discredit it and lead to its
eventual ouster. Today, in a negotiated settlement, management (and its public relations professionals) can at least seek to
present the outcome in the light most favorable to itself.
Skilled at spin control, management would rather settle than
fight.
23
LAZARD (2016), supra note 4, at 1. This 2017 study finds that the number
of activist campaigns was down in 2016 (by 17%) from 2015, but that the number
of board seats won (131) was an all-time high, suggesting that activists are becoming more successful. Id.
24
Id.
25
In 2016, Lazard found that activists had a “win rate” in actual proxy contests of only 38%. Id. at 1.
26
Protecting Long-Term Shareholder Interests in Activist Engagements, supra
note 5, at 1.
27
Id.
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The activists leading these campaigns are a concentrated
group of repeat players, with the table below showing that ten
well-known activists won 76 seats—or a clear majority of the
131 seats won by activists in 2016:28
TABLE A
Most Board seats Obtained 2

2016
Activist

# of Board Seats W on

Avg . Mkt Cap . of Targets 1

Starboard Value

21

$10,267

Elliott

12

47,026

2

Icahn

9

30,105

3

Engaged Capital

8

773

8

JANA
Pershing Square

6

Glenview

4

6,314

5

19,423

19

2,300

Altimeter/PAR

17,313

Barington

1,120

Lucus (Red Alder)

13

671

The majority of the seats filled by activists go to persons
resembling traditional independent directors, but Lazard found
in 2016, that 27% of contested board seats went to employees
of the activist fund.29 This statistic is important for a number
of reasons, including that there appears to be greater information leakage when hedge fund employees are placed on the
board (as later discussed).
On balance, the rate of hedge fund activism is increasing.
Although the number of activist campaigns fell somewhat in
2016, the actual number of seats won by activists increased.30
The even more significant statistic may be the number of new
entrants into this field. Lazard found that 37 activist investors
initiated activist campaigns for the first time in 2016.31 This
increase suggests that these first-time activists saw profits to
be made from the activism and have joined the parade.
As earlier noted, activist campaigns generally result in a
settlement, which is usually embodied in a settlement agreement. These agreements, which are typically (but not always)
28
LAZARD (2016), supra note 4, at 4. Elliott initiated the most campaigns (13),
but won fewer seats than Starboard Value. Id.
29
Id. at 1. Even this low 27% rate allows activists who are proposing a slate
of candidates (usually between 1 and 4) to include one hedge fund employee. As
we later find, approximately 70% of the slates proposed by activists in our data set
include at least one hedge fund employee. See infra Table 1 (finding that 331
activist employees have been appointed to boards and that 69.8% of the nominee
slates in our sample included at least one hedge fund employee).
30
LAZARD (2016), supra note 4, at 1.
31
Id.
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filed with the SEC, have seldom been studied. Professor Lucian
Bebchuk and several colleagues recently released one largescale study,32 but the study goes only until 2011, and much
has changed since then. Typically, these settlement agreements address a number of topics, including board composition, standstill provisions, expense reimbursement for the
activist, “non-disparagement” provisions, and, possibly, confidentiality provisions (which may or may not restrict the new
director or director–nominee from sharing information learned
at board meetings with others, including the hedge fund).
Such provisions, as next discussed, raise the possibility that
the hedge fund activist may receive benefits not available to
other shareholders.
A principal conclusion of the Bebchuk study was that
these agreements do not address the business operations or
policies of the corporation, but rather, focus only on the composition of the board.33 Bebchuk and his colleagues conclude
that this shows the efficiency of “incomplete contracting.”34
Those more experienced in corporate law would recognize that
there is a simpler (if theoretically less elegant) explanation for
this focus: directors, as fiduciaries, cannot contract away their
discretion. As many cases have held, a contract binding the
director, for example, to vote for increased dividends or a share
buyback would be unenforceable.35 Instead, the settlement
agreement must focus on what can be agreed upon: namely,
how shareholders will vote for directors and which directors
will agree to resign. “Incomplete contracting,” at least as an
explanation for the structure of settlement agreements, works
better in the hothouse of academia than in the real world.
In any event, it is clear that, in a high majority of settlement agreements, new directors are added to the board, usually through an expansion of the board’s size.36 According to
32

Bebchuk et al., supra note 14.
Id. at 4.
34
Id. at 14–17.
35
For early leading cases, see Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick
Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174 (1948); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323 (1934).
New York does permit closely held corporations to opt out of this rule by a charter
provision, but there is no exception applicable to publicly held firms. See N.Y.
BUS. CORP. LAW § 620(b) (Consol. 2018).
36
The study by Professor Bebchuk and his colleagues finds that new directors are added in 87.4% of the settlements they surveyed and some incumbent
directors leave the board in 40.77% of these settlements. Bebchuk et al., supra
note 14, at 21. Thus, the board will typically need to be expanded, which can
ordinarily be done by bylaw or board resolution if the corporate charter so
authorizes.
33
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the Bebchuk study, the median number of directors so added
is two (although, in at least a few recent cases, majority slates
of directors nominated by activists have been elected, giving
the activist fund de facto control).37 The only other provision
that is nearly universal is a standstill provision.38
Inevitably, these settlement negotiations provide opportunities for self-dealing by the activist, whose interests can conflict with those of the other shareholders. To give a well-known
example, Sotheby’s, the art auction house, was engaged in
2014 by Third Point LLC, a leading activist hedge fund,
founded by Daniel S. Loeb, one of the highest profile hedge
fund activists. Third Point commenced a proxy fight seeking to
place three directors on Sotheby’s board, but, on the eve of the
shareholder meeting (just before the voting outcome would
have been announced), Third Point settled in part for a $10
million payment by Sotheby’s as reimbursement of Third
Point’s expenses.39 Because Sotheby’s, itself, reported that it
had incurred expenses of only $5.7 million in opposing Third
Point’s campaign, this payment of $10 million to Third Point
surprised observers and arguably may have been overly generous.40 To be sure, Third Point also negotiated the appointment
of the three directors that it had originally sought, but the
question remains: was anything traded for this $10 million
payment? No conclusion is expressed here, because the relevant point is only that the interests of Third Point and the other

37
In the Bebchuk study, the median number added to the board was two. Id.
at 17. Still, there is high variation, and the Bebchuk study finds that in 17 cases,
the number appointed was four or more. Id. In 2016, well after the 2011 end date
of the Bebchuk study, Mantle Ridge, an activist fund, elected a majority slate of
directors to the board of CSX Corporation and brought in a new CEO, even though
Mantle Ridge held only around a 5% stake in CSX. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
38
The Bebchuk study also finds that a “standstill” provision is “almost universal.” Bebchuk et al., supra note 14, at 6. It further observes that there can be
two types of standstill provisions: (1) a limitation on share ownership by the
activist, and (2) a “corporate governance standstill” under which the solicitations
of proxies or other actions are halted. Id. at 6. Although we find that standstill
provisions are common, we also find that they do not typically restrict openmarket trading by the activist fund. Often, they are silent on this point, or they
may specify a maximum ceiling that the activist cannot cross, but which is above
its current ownership level. Generally, the standstill provision focuses more on
precluding a proxy contest or further board nominations by the activist or its
allies. See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
39
See Alexandra Stevenson, Sotheby’s to Reimburse Loeb $10 Million, N.Y.
TIMES (May 7, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/sothebys-toreimburse-loeb-10-million/ [https://perma.cc/64WH-VZ5V].
40
Id.
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shareholders could conflict. A tradeoff between management
and the activist in such a setting is easy to imagine.
The costs incurred by activists in campaigns for board representation are growing. In the recent and closely contested
campaign by the Trian Fund to place Nelson Peltz, its founder,
on the Proctor & Gamble (“P&G”) board, Trian estimated its
expected costs at $25 million, but acknowledged that they
could run higher.41 Had P&G’s management recognized that
Trian would win this proxy fight, P&G might have sought a
private settlement with Trian that reimbursed some or all of
Trian’s expenses. This, of course, raises the issue of what P&G
might have asked for in return.42
Other conflicts also inevitably exist. When the hedge fund
designates a director or directors (some of whom may be hedge
fund employees), it will typically remain in close contact with
its appointed directors and will likely obtain material, nonpublic information from them.43 Potentially, the hedge fund could
use that information itself, or it could pass it onto allies. This
behavior, depending on its facts, may or may not be unlawful
under the federal securities laws or under Delaware law, but
regardless, it is an agency cost to the extent it injures the
corporation or widens the bid-ask spread. This issue of legality
will be delayed until later, but the potential conflict could not
be clearer.

41
This estimate was made by Trian in its proxy statement, which conceded
that actual costs could prove higher. See Chris Isidore & David Goldman, Procter
& Gamble declares victory in expensive proxy fight, CNN MONEY (Oct. 10, 2017),
http://money.cnn.com.2017/10/10/new/companies/procter-gamble-proxyfight/index.html [https://perma.cc/XX57-PRJ9].
42
There are many things that corporate management might want in return
for reimbursement, including: (1) a standstill agreement under which the activist
agrees not to buy more stock or launch any proxy fight, and (2) a non-disparagement agreement under which the activist agrees not to criticize management
publicly. Both are common provisions in settlement agreements.
43
Delaware law does impose a duty of confidentiality on directors. See, e.g.,
Shocking Techs., Inc. v. Kosowsky, No. 7164-VCN, 2012 WL 4482838 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 1, 2012), vacated, 2015 WL 3455210 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2015) (finding director breached duty of loyalty by providing confidential information to investor);
Henshaw v. Am. Cement Corp., 252 A.2d. 125 (Del. Ch. 1969) (allowing inspection
of books and records, and limited disclosure so long as it does not breach director’s duty of confidentiality). Still, a respected Delaware Vice Chancellor has
recently opined that “directors are on solid ground when resisting confidentiality
agreements” and probably may share information learned at board meetings with
the hedge fund that nominated them and with related colleagues. See J. Travis
Laster & Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70
BUS. L. 33, 48–51 (2014). As later discussed, such sharing may result in broad
information leakage.
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A final area where there may be a “horizontal” conflict between the interests of the activist and the other shareholders
involves the choice and agenda of the new directors. Diversified institutional shareholders, possibly holding even more
stock, might prefer different directors with very different objectives. Recently, BlackRock, Inc., the world’s largest investment
manager, the Vanguard Group, another of the world’s largest
investment managers, and SSGA, also a very sizeable investment manager, have all publicly criticized hedge fund activists
and the recent settlement process, suggesting that they perceive themselves as having been excluded by these private
agreements from the role they deserve as “permanent shareholders,” often holding more stock than the activists.44 Professor Bebchuk and his colleagues discounted these criticisms,
because they found that the nominees selected by activist
hedge funds do not receive a lesser vote in subsequent director
elections.45 One problem with this interpretation, however, is
that the Bebchuk study covers results only until 2011, and
these large diversified investors began voicing their concerns
and criticisms only more recently in 2015 and 2016.46 Thus, it
remains a very open and debatable issue whether this process
is benign.
All that need be concluded at this stage is that activists will
usually resolve their differences with the firms they engage
through private negotiations that typically change the composition of the board. In the aftermath, the CEO will frequently
depart.47 Although this process probably focuses on underperforming firms, it has still troubled much larger institutional investors, who consider themselves the target
corporation’s “permanent” shareholders, but find themselves
ignored in these negotiations.

44
See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. For SSGA’s objections, see
infra notes 105–107 and accompanying text.
45
See Bebchuk et al., supra note 14, at 5.
46
See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
47
The Bebchuk study finds that 18.6% of CEOs depart within a year after the
settlement agreement (although only about 3% of such agreements provide for the
CEO’s departure). See Bebchuk et al., supra note 14, at 16. A more recent study
by FTI Consulting places the departure rates for CEOs after activist nominees are
added to the board at 34.1% and 55.1% over one and two years, respectively,
following these appointments. See Sonali Basak & Beth Jinks, Activist Investors
Double Chance of CEO Exits, Study Shows, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2016), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-21/activist-investors-doublechance-of-ceo-exits-study-shows [https://perma.cc/7ZBU-CNDM].
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II
AGENCY COSTS OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM: AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS
It is possible to hypothesize a variety of ways in which the
activist hedge fund can gain private benefits not available to
other shareholders or can act contrary to the wishes of the
majority of the shareholders because of the leverage it possesses. In the Theoretical Appendix, we set out a formal model
underlying many of the arguments we sketch out in this Part.
Here, we provide a brief survey of these private benefits, which
are enough to raise serious concerns. We begin by describing
the data used to establish our empirical claims.
A.

Activist Settlements and Director Appointments

We began by constructing a hand-drawn dataset on activist settlements. First, we pulled all activist events between
January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2015 from SharkRepellent. Next, based on SharkRepellent’s data, we divided
the engagements into those that resulted in the activist receiving board representation and those that did not.48 We then
examined the securities filings of firms in the former group to
identify the nature of the settlement agreement, if any, that led
to the appointment of the activist’s representative to the
board.49
We then coded the set of activist settlements along several
dimensions.50 First, we identified the date on which the activist’s representative gains access to the boardroom.51 We
48
We focus on activist directors appointed through the settlement process
because the contracting and compensation dynamic we refer to in Part II above is
more reflective of settlement agreements than the uncertain products of the proxy
fight process—a process that introduces additional costs and benefits that complicated our analysis. We intend to study activist directors elected through the
proxy machinery in future work.
49
We note that our dataset includes cases both where a formal settlement
agreement is disclosed and where the target company simply notes in a later
securities filing that the board and the activist have reached an agreement to
appoint the activist’s representative to the board. Both situations reflect an
agreement to give the activist representation on the board, and in both cases the
activists’ representative can be expected to have access to material nonpublic
information.
50
We exclude from the dataset any events where the target company lacks
data in the Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP) database, where an
activist has previously gained representation on the target company’s board, or
where an incumbent director participates in the activist campaign itself.
51
Ordinarily this is simply the exact date on which the new director joins the
board—either by way of board appointment or election from the management
slate at the annual meeting. We note, however, that in approximately 8% of the
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then identified the name of each new director and whether the
director is an employee of the activist or is an industry expert.52
We also drew from SharkRepellent information on whether the
activist is a hedge fund, individual, investment advisor, corporation, mutual fund, named stockholder group, pension fund,
or other institution or stakeholder.
Finally, we examined the settlement agreements themselves, coding for whether the agreements prohibit the activist’s initiation of or participation in a formal proxy fight or
provide for the reimbursement of the activist’s expenses—both
the amount and kind of expenses permitted, e.g., filing fees,
time, and cost. In light of our focus on information leakage, we
also coded whether the agreement contains an express rule
restricting information sharing, refers to an information-sharing rule in a separate confidentiality agreement, or refers to a
generic policy on information sharing. In addition, we record
whether these information-sharing policies apply only to new
directors appointed pursuant to the settlement or whether the
hedge fund itself is explicitly referenced in the agreement.
Table 1 below provides summary statistics on the characteristics of the 475 settlement agreements in our dataset:

settlements in our dataset the activist instead settles for board “observer” rights,
in which the new director gains access to the boardroom before her formal appointment to the board. In these cases, we record the date on which the observer
rights become effective. For an example, see Settlement Agreement By and
Among Axcelis Technologies and Vertex Capital (Mar. 5, 2015), https://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/11132321113232/000110465915017346/a
15-1574_3ex99d2.htm [https://perma.cc/4Z7E-UW3Q] (permitting “each of the
[activist’s chosen directors to be] appointed as an observer to the Board until the
2015 Annual Meeting . . .[and will] receive copies of all notices and written information furnished to the full Board, reasonably in advance of each meeting to the
extent practicable, and [will be] permitted to be present at all meetings of the full
Board”).
52
We rely on SEC filings, company websites, and Bloomberg profiles to identify each director’s background and relationship to the activist.
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS: ACTIVIST SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS.
This Table summarizes the characteristics of the 475
settlement agreements that constitute our principal sample.
Settlement Terms
Average Number of Board
Seats Acquired by Activist
Activist Directors Granted
Observer Rights in
Advance of Appointment
New Director Group
Includes Activist
Employee
Agreement Includes
Publicly Disclosed
Standstill
Average Standstill Length
(in Annual Meetings)
Agreement Calls for
Reimbursement of Activist
Expenses

Number of
Observations

% of Overall
Sample

1.76

(—)

37

7.8%

331

69.8%

263

55.4%

1.47

(—)

166

34.9%

As Table 1 shows, on average each activist engagement
results in the appointment of just fewer than two activist representatives to the target company’s board, and in nearly 70% of
the agreements at least one of these representatives is an employee of the activist itself.
B.

Confidentiality and Information Sharing Provisions

Of the 475 agreements in our sample, ninety-two (or
19.4%) contain an express restriction on information sharing.53 In sixty-four of these ninety-two cases, the restriction is
set forth in the agreement, and in the remainder it is contained
53
These provisions range from strict to more permissive. For an example of a
strict provision, one such agreement (between A.M. Castle & Co., the target firm,
and Raging Capital Group, LLC, an activist investment advisor, and certain individuals in 2015) provided:
Each Member agrees that the Confidential Information shall be kept
confidential and that the Members and their Representatives shall
not disclose any of the Confidential Information in any manner
whatsoever without the specific prior written consent of the Company unless disclosure is required by applicable laws or regulations
or pursuant to legal, judicial or regulatory proceedings . . . .
Certain very limited exceptions are then carved out. Settlement Agreement By
and Among A. M. Castle & Co. and Raging Capital Group (Mar. 17, 2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/18172/0000018172150
00009/exhibit101ragingcapitalset.htm [https://perma.cc/FYT2-G5V4].
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in a separate confidentiality agreement.54 In addition, some
seventy-three agreements (or another 16%) refer to a “policy”
on information sharing.55 Regardless of whether the information-sharing provision takes the form of a contractual rule or a
state policy, we find that some ninety agreements contain an
express reference to the activist investor, but these references
usually still permit this investor easily to share information
with others.56
54
Confidentiality agreements are frequently not filed by an issuer with its
Form 8-K or press release announcing the settlement agreement, and thus we did
not have full access to them.
55
For example, one such “policy” (in a settlement agreement between the
same parties as in supra note 53, but negotiated a year later in 2016) stated:
The [RC] nominee will be governed by the same obligations regarding conflicts of interest, duties, confidentiality, trading and disclosure policies and other governance guidelines as are applicable to
all other directors of the Company, all of which policies and guidelines as in effect on the date hereof have been provided by the
Company to the [RC] Group.
Settlement Agreement By and Among A. M. Castle & Co. and Raging Capital
Group (May 27, 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives /edgar/data/
18172/000162612916000625/ex10-1.htm. [https://perma.cc/4PPB-3DJB].
Essentially, this “policy” states that the fund-nominated directors are subject
to the same rules as the other directors, but it is far from transparent on what
those rules are.
56
Here, it is useful to give three examples:
1. In the case of a “Nomination and Standstill Agreement,” dated
February 25, 2014, by and among CONMED Corporation (the
target firm), the Coppersmith Group (the activist investor), and
certain nominee directors, Exhibit A to this Agreement provided:
“Nothing contained in this Agreement shall prevent the Director
from disclosing Confidential Information” to certain persons,
defined as “Representatives,” which term includes a “principal
of Coppersmith.” Then, it adds that in the case of disclosure to
such a “Representative” of the director: “Any Director Representative shall only be provided Confidential Information by the
Director to the extent that they are informed of the confidential
nature of the Confidential Information and agree or are otherwise obligated to keep such information confidential and to restrict the use of such Confidential Information in accordance
with the terms of this Agreement.”
Thus, the director can share with the company’s advisors and its activist sponsor,
but the director is required to observe confidentiality (which may allow the director to inform still others if these persons in turn promise to observe confidentiality). See Nomination and Standstill Agreement (Feb. 25, 2014), available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/816956/000089183614000036/ex_
10-1.htm [https://perma.cc/CS9L-2MBZ].
2. In the case of a “Form of Confidentiality Agreement” attached to
a “Director Appointment Agreement,” dated November 1, 2014,
by and among Epiq Systems, Inc. (the target), and St. Denis J.
Villere & Company, L.L.C., (the activist investor), and certain
director nominees, the Confidentiality Agreement permitted the
director to disclose Confidential Information to the director’s
“attorneys, advisors, directors, members, officials, and employees” who were collectively defined as its “Representatives.” Par-
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Even after recognizing that many of these provisions are
equivocal to weak, the fact still stands out that, in the remaining 64% of the 475 agreements in our sample, nothing is said
in publicly available documents about confidentiality or information sharing. As noted earlier,57 the market’s response to an
agreement without any provision on information sharing is
modest and dwarfed by its more positive reaction to the presence of such a provision. Although multiple explanations are
possible for this disparity,58 it at least suggests that it is important to many activists that they be able to share broadly the
agraph 2 of this Confidentiality Agreement required the Director
Representatives to “not disclose any of the Confidential Information in any manner whatsoever without the prior written consent of the Company.”
See Director Appointment Agreement (Nov. 1, 2014), available at https://www.
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1027207/000119312514395568/d815407dex
994.htm [https://perma.cc/3N37-EJME]. Once again, the employees, directors,
members, and officials of the activist investor can receive full access to what the
nominee learns at board meetings (but are subject to a confidentiality obligation).
3. Another variant on this general format was used by the Barington Group (the activist investor) in an “Agreement” it entered
into with Lancaster Colony Corporation (the target) on October
9, 2007. It provides that: “The members of the Barington Group
(each, a “Recipient”) each acknowledge the confidential and proprietary nature of the Confidential Information (as defined below) and agree that the Confidential Information (a) will be kept
confidential by Recipient and Recipient’s Representatives and
(b) will not be disclosed by Recipient (except to other Recipients
and their Affiliates and Associates and such person’s Representatives to the extent contemplated by this Agreement) or by Recipient’s Representatives (as defined below) to any person
except with the specific prior written consent of the Company or
except as expressly otherwise permitted by this Agreement.”
See Agreement by and Among Lancaster Colony Corp. and the Barington Group
(Oct. 9, 2007), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/57515/
000095015207007990/l28268aexv99w2.htm [https://perma.cc/JM2R-EABN].
In all these cases, the agreement specifically permits the activist investor
(here, as a “Recipient”) to obtain Confidential Information and share it with its
“Representatives” (which term includes its “advisors” and employees). Thus, this
scope can include a large number of persons, all learning potentially marketmoving information.
57
See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting that the five-day difference in CARs is 2.2% versus 0.42%—or more than five times).
58
This disparity could plausibly relate to the identity of the hedge fund. If
some activist funds were disfavored by the market (for any of a number of possible
reasons) and these funds would not tolerate a confidentiality provision, then the
disparity might relate less to the issue of confidentiality than to the identity of the
fund. However, because 64% of the settlement agreements in our data sample do
not contain any information-sharing provision, it seems unlikely that the disparity is attributable to the “bad” reputation of some funds. It is possible, however,
that some activist funds with a “good” reputation do characteristically agree to a
confidentiality restriction, and that the market is responding more to their identity than to the provision.
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information they obtain from their director nominees. Later,
we will suggest why activist funds may feel this need.59
C.

Private Payments

It is not uncommon for a corporation “engaged” by an activist hedge fund to agree to reimburse the fund for the expenses that it allegedly incurred in connection with the
engagement. These expenses might include SEC filing fees,
legal expenses, or the costs of an actual proxy campaign (if one
was conducted or if a draft proxy statement was prepared).
Here, the Sotheby’s campaign stands out with its $10 million
payment to Third Point.
How typical is such a large payment? The Bebchuk study
includes no findings on this issue. In our dataset of 475 settlement agreements, we find that 166 (35%) have an expenses
reimbursement provision of some sort. We are able to identify
a definite amount of expense reimbursement in 148 agreements. The mean and median amounts of expense reimbursement are $328,753 and $100,000, respectively. Out of these
148 settlement agreements, forty-one (27.7%) provide for a reimbursement in the amount of $250,000 or more, nineteen
(12.8%) provide for $500,000 or more, and seven (4.7%) have
an amount of $1,000,000 or more.
These data suggest that payments of the same order of
magnitude as that paid by Sotheby’s to Third Point are few.
Although reimbursement is not uncommon, the amounts so
paid are usually modest. Because significant and legitimate
legal expenses could be incurred by the activist in conducting
an engagement, the limited reimbursement that hedge funds
report suggests that activists may be constrained by the fear of
reputational damage if they disclosed a substantial payment.
Alternatively, the activist may want to proclaim that it expects
to make such a large profit on its engagement that it does not
need to be concerned with penny-ante matters, such as expense reimbursement. Conceivably, some activists do receive a
sizable payment, but fail to report it on the ground that it is not
financially material. Still, this seems unlikely to us for a variety of reasons.60
What does the corporation gain for its payment? Some
have suggested that the corporation typically gains a “non59

See infra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
One reason is that management of the target would also need to make a
disclosure about the settlement agreement, and the possibility that both would
agree not to disclose the payment seems small in our judgment.
60

2019]

ACTIVIST DIRECTORS AND AGENCY COSTS

407

disparagement” provision in the settlement agreement. These
provisions, which are very common in settlement agreements,
bar the activist from publicly criticizing the corporation and its
management for the duration of the agreement. In effect, the
activist, as the champion of the shareholders, is silenced.
Other forms of payments are also possible. In 2017, Mantle Ridge Partners, LP, a newcomer to hedge fund activism,
conducted an extraordinarily successful engagement with CSX
Corp. Although holding less than 5% of CSX’s stock, Mantle
Ridge was able to secure the appointment of four of its nominees to the CSX board, including a new CEO, E. Hunter Harrison, who brought with him a new strategic plan for CSX.
Effectively, Mantle Ridge and its new CEO engineered a palace
coup d’etat at CSX. Then, Mantle Ridge asked the CSX shareholders to approve the CEO’s pay package in an advisory vote
at CSX’s annual shareholder meeting. This package included
an $84 million reimbursement to Mantle Ridge of the compensation and benefits forfeited by Harrison when he resigned as
the CEO of Canadian Pacific to take the position at CSX.61
Although the transaction produced a major stock price jump in
CSX’s stock, others have noted the shareholders had little
choice, as Harrison had indicated that he would resign if the
reimbursement was not ratified by CSX’s shareholders.62 Because Harrison’s resignation might have caused a decline in
the stock price that erased the earlier gain, CSX’s shareholders
were effectively faced with Hobson’s choice.
Cases such as CSX show both that shareholders may be
pressured to ratify steps taken by their activist champion and
61
For a description of this contest, see Shawn Tully, CSX CEO Hunter Harrison’s Pay is No Great Train Robbery, FORTUNE (Mar. 24, 2017), http://fortune.
com/2017/03/24/csx-hunter-harrison-pay/ [https://perma.cc/4D86-M98V].
The payment went to Mantle Ridge, as it had earlier reimbursed Harrison. CSX’s
shareholders did vote by a wide margin to approve this payment in an advisory
vote; thereafter, the CSX board made the legally binding decision to approve the
payment. See Michael Flaherty, CSX Shareholders Approve $84 million Reimbursement to Mantle Ridge, REUTERS (June 5, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-csx-harrison/csx-shareholders-approve-84-million-reimbursementto-mantle-ridge-idUSKBN18W1Y6 [https://perma.cc/TR46-3L7J]. Harrison died
in December 2017, presenting issues about this ratification that are beyond the
scope of this Article.
62
In a review of the transaction, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP observed that “a reasonable argument could be made that the shareholder vote is . . .
a veneer to shield the board from a tough call.” See Ethan A. Klingsberg & Arthur
H. Kohn, Balancing Concessions to Activists Against Responsiveness to the
Broader Shareholder Base, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr.
4, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/04/balancing-concessionsto-activists-against-responsiveness-to-the-broader-shareholder-base/ [https://
perma.cc/7PGC-CKGE].
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that shareholders can earn extraordinary stock gains from activism. Obviously, the goal should be to reduce agency costs
without eliminating the shareholder gains.
D.

Information Leakage: Empirical Study

In this Part, we present an empirical study, which finds
that the appointment of an activist nominee or nominees to a
corporate board is followed by a short-term increase in information leakage into the target’s stock price. That is, prior to
the targeted corporation’s public disclosure of material information (positive or negative) in the period after an activist nominee is appointed to the board (or granted “observer” status at
board meetings), its stock price drifts in the direction that the
later corporate disclosure produces. The market reacts to new
developments before they are publicly announced, probably because informed trading by those with access to material, nonpublic information is decoded by other traders to imply a likely
gain or loss.
To motivate our empirical study of leakage, we first calculate CARs to announcements of settlement agreements. In our
entire sample of settlement agreements, we find that the average five-day announcement CAR is 2.64%. But this average
conceals substantial heterogeneity. When we examine settlements without any hedge fund employee appointed to the
board, we find that the five-day CAR is 4.21%, compared to
1.95% for settlements with an employee-nominee appointed to
the board. This suggests that the market is skeptical of hedge
fund employees as directors. Similarly, when we examine settlements with an express rule on information sharing or a rule
in a separate confidentiality agreement, we find that the fiveday CAR is 2.25%, compared to 0.42% for those settlements
that contain neither of those restrictions on information
sharing.63
This presents a puzzle. Why do activist funds continue to
appoint their employees to the board and avoid express confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements, despite the
market’s clear contrary preferences? Activists may believe that
the advantages of having an activist on the board and skipping
any confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement outweigh the costs of bucking the market’s preferences. Those
63
As noted at supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text, 19.4% of our data
sample has a contractual provision that restricted information sharing and another 16% refers to a “policy” on information sharing. Thus, slightly over 64% are
silent on this issue and seem to experience a much smaller CAR.
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more skeptical of activism suspect that information sharing by
the lead activist with its allies may be an important means by
which the lead activist can hold together its loose coalition of
allies (or wolf pack) and thus maintain its leverage over the
target company.64 Another possibility is that activist funds
appoint employees and disdain confidentiality provisions
chiefly when the activists already possess sufficient leverage
that target managements dare not resist them for fear that they
will incur a proxy contest that they are unlikely to win.65 No
conclusion or preferred theory is here expressed.
In any event, we next examine how information leakage
correlates with these two variables (i.e., an employee nominee
and the absence of a confidentiality provision). We construct a
dataset that enables us to evaluate the incorporation of information into public-company stock prices. In general, federal
law requires many material events to be disclosed on Form 8-K,
which generally must be filed within four business days after
the occurrence of the event. Thus, Form 8-K filings are typically not scheduled well in advance of their filing and often
respond to unexpected developments. We begin with 635,490
Form 8-Ks filed by 7,799 publicly traded companies over the
period of January 1, 2000 to September 30, 2016.
For each Form 8-K filing, we seek to examine the pace at
which the information in the filing makes its way into the company’s stock price. To do so, we derive a “leakage” measure for
a given firm (which we denote as firm “i”) filing a form 8-K on a
given date (which we denote as date “t”), which we denote leaki,t,
and is equivalent to a standard measure used in the finance
literature known as the “Weighted Price Contribution.”66 We
calculate this measure as follows:
ri
leaki,t = t-s,t-1
i
rt-st, 0
Put simply, the leakage measure is a fraction: the numerator is
the percentage change67 in the closing stock price of the firm
filing the Form 8-K from (a) five days before the event to (b) the
day before the event, and the denominator is the percentage
64

We discuss this possibility later in infra notes 86–90 and accompanying

text.
65
In these cases, the market may already expect an activist victory, so the
stock market response to the use of a hedge fund employee may be more muted.
66
Michael J. Barclay & Terrence Hendershott, Price Discovery and Trading
After Hours, 16 REV. FIN. STUD., 1041, 1055, 1058 (2003).
67
These are actually the natural log of 1 + the percentage change, i.e., the
continuously compounded return over that time.
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change in the closing stock price of the firm filing the Form 8-K
from (a) five days before the event to (b) the day of the event.
To take a simple example, suppose that the firm’s stock
price was $10 at the close of business five days before the
event, $11 the day before the event, and $12 on the day of the
event. The numerator of the ratio is approximately 10%:68 $10
(the price five days before) to $11 (the price one day before) is
an increase of 10%. The denominator of the ratio is approximately 20%: $10 (the price five days before) to $12 (the price on
the day of the event) is an increase of 20%. The leakage is 50%,
which is obtained by calculating 10% / 20%. On average, then,
higher levels of leakage indicate that information reflected in
the Form 8-K made its way into stock prices in the day before
the actual disclosure of that information on Form 8-K.69
The key idea is that this ratio increases as more information makes its way into the stock price prior to the announcement date. However, working with this ratio poses certain
challenges as an empirical matter. Theoretically, this ratio
should remain bounded between zero and one—e.g., if the
stock price goes up by $2 from five days before to the day of the
disclosure (inclusive), it should not go up by $3 from five days
before disclosure to the day before the disclosure and fall by $1
on the day of disclosure. But in practice, this often happens—
simply because markets are not perfectly efficient and trading
is noisy. Once we recognize that prices can move for random
reasons, it is possible that the denominator may be very close
to zero while the numerator is not, causing the ratio to “blow
up” dramatically. This poses nontrivial challenges for statistical inference.70
68
We use the term “approximately” because of the continuously compounding return.
69
We note that information disclosed on Form 8-K is occasionally previously
disclosed to the public in the form of press releases or other public announcements. To address that possibility we search the text of each Form 8-K for
phrases related to the issuance of a press release and control for the presence of
that phrase in our leakage analysis.
70
Technically, suppose that both rf-s,t-1
at-s,t-1
Et-s,t-1 and

=

where

Et-5,t-1 and

+

are zero-mean i.i.d. nor-

mally distributed random variables. Even if it is the case that
does not follow that E
Et-5,t-1
Et-5,to

rf_s t-1]
[ . '

rit-5,t 0

= at-s
't-1 < 1.
a
t-5,t 0

at-s t-1
-----'-'< 1, it
at-5,t 0

The ratio of the noise terms

is the ratio of two zero-mean normally random variables. This term is

Cauchy distributed for which both the first and second moment are not defined.
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There are two ways to address this problem. The standard
approach in the finance literature is to multiply this ratio by a
weight that is proportional to the absolute value of the denominator. This is the approach taken by Michael Barclay and Terrence Hendershott when deriving the “Weighted Price
Contribution,” which they use to measure how much stock
prices move during different times of the day.71 This ensures
that observations which have a denominator very close to zero
receive a weight very close to zero. We adopt this approach for
our primary results, weighting OLS regressions by the absolute
value of the denominator.
An alternative approach is to remove filings with “negative”
leakage (i.e., where the numerator and denominator of the ratio
had different signs), as the ratio is not meaningful in that case,
and to remove filings with leakage greater than 1, which implies a market “overreaction” to the news, while adjusting the
coefficient estimates and standard errors for the truncation.72
As we show below, our results are generally consistent, both in
sign and statistical significance, across these two
specifications.
We code as “treatment” filings Form 8-Ks filed by firms that
entered into activist settlement agreements and code as “post”
filings Form 8-Ks filed after the date that the new director
gained access to material nonpublic information, either by joining the board or obtaining observer rights to its deliberations.73
This results in essentially 475 different treatments occurring
between 2000 and 2016. This gives us comfort that, from the
perspective of causal identification, the effect we measure is
unlikely to be driven by an unobservable time trend over a
single period of time.
Another challenge with making causal inferences as to the
effect of appointing activist directors on information leakage is
constructing an appropriate “control group.” We consider multiple approaches to show that our results are not driven by the
choice of a single kind of control group. Our primary estima71

The formula for the weight is simple:

lrf-s,to

W·
i

I

which is exactly
= L Ii
rt-5,to I

what Barclay & Hendershott utilize in the Weighted Price Contribution. See Barclay & Hendershott, supra note 66, at 1055.
72
We estimate the truncated re gression model via maximum likelihood as
described in J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES 192 (1997).
73
To reduce the likelihood that the results are driven by differences in leakage far away in time from the date on which the director first gains access to the
boardroom, we limit the sample window to an even shorter period before and after
the new director gains access to material nonpublic information.
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tions use a “same-industry” control group: we collect, for each
settlement agreement, all the Form 8-K filings by other public
companies with the same 4-digit SIC industry code as the target firm. For each settlement, there is a treatment firm and a
group of control firms which are assigned the same “access to
material nonpublic information” date. As we explain below, we
further apply propensity-score matching to ensure that we are
comparing pre to post differences in leakage between the treatment firms and groups of control firms that are as similar as
possible.
For several reasons, we considered it important to verify
that the disclosure behavior was similar between our treatment
and control groups. In other words, did companies that were
the target of a hedge fund engagement file more (or less) Form
8-Ks than those in the treatment group. We find disclosure
behavior to be remarkably similar between the two groups.
Figure 2 shows a “kernel density plot” for the years between
2000 and 2015.74 The close congruence it reveals between the
control and treatment groups suggests that the disclosure behavior of public firms does not change because of the appointment of an activist director; both seem to file Form 8-Ks with
the same frequency.

74
A “kernel density plot” shows the frequency of Form 8-K filings at very
small intervals of time; the y-axis units are thus extremely small.
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SUMMARY STATISTICS: KERNEL DENSITY PLOT OF FORM 8-K FILINGS
OVER TIME. The plot below illustrates the volume of Form 8-K
filings over time in both our treatment and control groups; as
shown below, the incidence of Form 8-Ks in each group over
time is statistically indistinguishable.
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We derive several additional variables for each firm which
could plausibly affect information leakage: its market capitalization (number of shares times price), the Amihud illiquidity
measure,75 and the idiosyncratic volatility of the firm’s stock.76
Each of these are calculated over the month preceding each
Form 8-K filing.
We also calculate the log of the firm’s book-to-market ratio,
using its most recent Compustat annual report. We compute
the length of the Form 8-K filing as well as whether it refers to a
“press release,” which might indicate that the filing does not
necessarily contain new, public information. Finally, we extract the item numbers—that is, legally specified categories of
75
The Amihud illiquidity measure is the average of the daily ratio of the
absolute stock return for that day to the trading volume of that day, as described
in Yakov Amihud, Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series
Effects, 5 J. FIN. MKTS. 31 (2000). For computational simplicity, we depart slightly
from the original Amihud paper by using number of shares in the denominator,
rather than dollar volume; the two are virtually indistinguishable in daily trading
data.
76
Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of what remains after subtracting the predictions of asset pricing model from stock returns.
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information—from each Form 8-K filing.77 We merge the leakage data with these additional variables, along with the
“treatment characteristics” coding from the activist settlement
agreements, to arrive at the final dataset used in the analysis
described below.
Table 2 presents summary statistics from this dataset, including the number of Form 8-K filings, as well as statistics
such as the mean, standard deviation, median, and various
percentiles for each Form 8-K in the dataset. Variables that
correspond to a firm—like the Amihud illiquidity measure or
idiosyncratic volatility—reflect the firm filing the Form 8-K and
are “linked” to the Form 8-K filed by that firm because these
could potentially explain variation in leakage.

77
Public companies today are required to file a Form 8-K for a wide range of
corporate events. In securities law parlance, the various events that are subject to
disclosure on Form 8-K are referred to as “items.” For example, Item 1.03 on
Form 8-K requires disclosure of whether the company has entered bankruptcy or
receivership, Item 2.01 requires disclosure of the completion of the acquisition or
sale of corporate assets, and so on.

2019]

ACTIVIST DIRECTORS AND AGENCY COSTS

415

TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS: ESTIMATION DATASET.
Variable
Leakage
Denominator
(% change 5
days before
to event day)
Leakage
Numerator
(% change 5
days before
to 1 day
before)
Leakage
Measure
Treatment
Dummy
(=1 for 8-Ks
by targets)
“Post”
Dummy
(=1 for 8-Ks
filed after
settlement
agreement)
Hedge Fund
Dummy
Hedge Fund
Employee
Dummy
Amihud
(2002)
Illiquidity
Idiosyncratic
Volatility
Market
Capitalization
Log Book to
Market Ratio
Days
Between
Activist
Intervention
and 8-K
Filing Date
Length of 8-K
Filing
(Characters)

Number
of 8-K
Filings

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Min.

575,196

-0.003

0.129

-2.695

-0.054

575,196

-0.002

0.087

-2.678

575,196

0.584

0.265

575,196

0.022

575,196

th

25
Median
Percentile

th

75
Percentile

Max.

0.004

0.049

3.545

-0.029

0.001

0.027

3.449

0.0001

0.380

0.621

0.807

1.000

0.147

0

0

0

0

1

0.462

0.499

0

0

0

1

1

12,681

0.811

0.391

0

1

1

1

1

12,681

0.700

0.458

0

0

1

1

1

500,756

4.933

8.419

0.000

1.269

2.379

5.006

782.695

500,659

0.030

0.026

0.000

0.015

0.023

0.036

1.393

500,757 5,770,181 23,888,702 633.566

157,635

591,091 2,159,389 735,734,809

476,990

-4.883

1.739

-12.902

-5.946

-4.846

-3.803

16.001

575,196

-53.424

588.806

-1,064

-552

-70

425

1,064

575,190

548,488

2,123,165

1,315

27,811

74,620

307,421

152,816,998

Our analysis mainly considers whether the change in leakage before and after the activist intervention differs between
our treatment and control groups. This is known as a “difference in differences” design because we compare the change
over time (difference #1) between treatment and control (difference #2). We restrict our sample to “time windows” of 120 days
on either side of the activist board appointment date. But we
exclude the three weeks on either side of this date to ensure
that our results are not driven by leakage of information regarding the settlement agreement itself.
The difference-in-differences design relies on the assumption that the treatment and control groups follow parallel
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trends over time—that is, in the absence of the activist settlement, changes in leakage over time would remain similar between the two groups. Qualitatively, there is no reason to
suspect that activist funds choose targets that are more likely
to experience greater information leakage in the months following the intervention. While we acknowledge, of course, that
activist investors select targets based on characteristics such
as relative historical performance,78 we see little basis to worry
that those characteristics are correlated with time trends in
information leakage.79 We also verify this assumption below.
In addition to a difference-in-differences design, we employ
propensity-score matching to make it more likely that the treatment and control firms are as comparable as possible. Matching methods have become increasingly popular in empirical
corporate governance research.80 These methods allow for
forming pairs or small groups of firms who are similar on observable dimensions and compare only those firms to each
other, effectively weighting by similarity. We match treatment
and control firms based on observable covariates including the
log of market capitalization, Amihud illiquidity, idiosyncratic
volatility, the book-to-market ratio, whether the filing refers to
a press release, 1-digit SIC code, as well as the following Form
8-K item disclosures:81
 Item 1.01: Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement
78

See Cremers et al., supra note 1, at 6.
To give an illustration of why a selection critique of this kind is unlikely to
be a problem in this design, suppose that hedge funds select targets on the basis
of poor governance, and suppose, in turn, that poor governance is correlated with
insider trading activity. But in a difference-in-differences design, the results can
only be biased by time-varying omitted variables. Thus, for this objection to be
problematic it must be the case that hedge funds select targets for activist intervention on the basis of unobserved trends in increasing leakage. It is hard to
imagine what such a trend might be, especially because, with 475 different activist directors gaining boardroom access at different points in time, this kind of
time trend cannot merely be a spurious coincidence at a particular moment in
calendar time—it must be a consistent trend throughout time.
80
See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422, 434
(2017) (using a matching method to analyze long-term firm value and board
structure).
81
Because we only have so much data, we are limited in our ability to match
on high-dimensional covariates like Form 8-K item numbers in addition to a 4digit SIC code. The standard approach in this kind of situation is to “coarsen” the
matching groups, i.e., to choose covariates at a sufficiently broad level of generality that the matching is feasible. See, e.g., Stefano M. Iacus, Gary King & Giuseppe Porro, CEM: Software for Coarsened Exact Matching, 30 J. STAT. SOFTWARE
1, 1–27 (2009) (discussing a program that implements the coarsened exact
matching algorithm). We apply this sort of coarsened matching by using 1-digit
SIC code and choosing the most important categories of Form 8-K filings.
79
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Item 2.02: Results of Operations and Financial Condition
Item 5.02(a)-(b): Departure of Directors or Certain Officers
Item 5.02(d): Election of Directors
Item 7.01: Regulation FD Disclosure
Item 8.01: Other Events

We allow up to five nearest neighbors so that results are not
driven by arbitrarily close matches.
We empirically verify the validity of these matching methods in two ways. First, we perform a “balance test” examining
whether the propensity-score matching succeeded in yielding a
balanced treatment and control group. The results are shown
in Table 3.
TABLE 3. BALANCE TEST ON FIRM AND FILING CHARACTERISTICS. In
this Table, we compare the means of each of the key covariates
used in the matching design between treatment and control.
The table shows the mean for each of the groups, the difference
as a percentage of the treated group, the t-statistic of this
difference, and the associated p-value. A p-value above .05
indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in
the means of the two groups, indicating that the null
hypothesis of balance on these observable characteristics
cannot be rejected.
Mean

Amihud (2002)
Log Market Value
Contains “Press Release”
Idiosyncratic Volatility
Book-to-Market Ratio
Item 1.01: Entry into a
Material Definitive
Agreement
Item 2.02: Results of
Operations and Financial
Condition
Item 5.02(a)-(b): Departure of
Directors or Certain Officers
Item 5.02(d): Election of
Directors
Item 7.01: Regulation FD
Disclosure
Item 8.01: Other Events

Control
0.43667
13.209
0.60437
0.02808
-4.5587

%
bias
-1.5
0.1
0.5
1.7
2.7

tstatistic
-0.54
0.04
0.15
0.61
0.83

pvalue
0.592
0.97
0.882
0.54
0.405

0.16439 0.17236

-2.2

-0.64

0.519

0.28345 0.27974

0.8

0.25

0.803

0.17641 0.17553

0.2

0.07

0.945

0.24468 0.24697

-0.6

-0.16

0.872

0.17094 0.16395
0.23867 0.23539

1.8
0.8

0.57
0.23

0.571
0.816

Treated
0.4259
13.212
0.60677
0.02851
-4.5058

In addition, we plot the density of the propensity score for the
treatment and control groups. If the two groups are balanced
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on observable characteristics, the propensity score should appear similar between the two groups. Figure 4 shows this is
indeed the case.

20

FIGURE 4. DENSITY OF PROPENSITY SCORE. This Figure plots the
empirical density of the propensity score for the treatment and
control groups. As the Figure shows, the two groups are
balanced on observable characteristics.
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Finally, in the Online Appendix, we show that pre-trends on the
leakage outcome for the treatment and control groups are parallel, which is an important condition for the kind of differencein-differences design that we employ here to be valid. Taken
together, these results suggest that the leakage findings in this
Article are not driven by differences in the kind of information
firms are disclosing to the market. Satisfied that our identification assumption is consistent with the evidence, we now turn
to measuring the effects of activist settlements, and the directors appointed pursuant to those settlements, on leakage at the
firms that enter into those agreements.
E.

Information Leakage after Activist Directors Gained
Boardroom Access

We first consider whether the change in leakage before and
after the date on which the activist settlement gives a new
director access to the boardroom differs between our treatment
and control firms. To evaluate this question, we perform a
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regression analysis which estimates the change in leakage from
before to after the director is appointed to the board and compares that change between the treatment and control groups.
Next, we seek to find if there are significant differences in leakage depending on who is appointed to the board (in particular,
an independent person versus a hedge fund employee). As
noted above, we code each director’s identity on the basis of
public searches and classify directors according to whether or
not they are employees of the activist investor.82 Finally, we
consider whether the post-settlement increases in leakage we
identify vary depending on the presence or absence of confidentiality provisions in the settlement agreement. The differencein-differences coefficients from each of these estimations are
shown in Table 5 using our primary specification and in Table
6 using our alternative truncation model.
TABLE 5. INFORMATION LEAKAGE. In this Table, we estimate the
difference in the over-time change in leakage between the
treatment and control groups. We show the results of OLS
regression models in which the dependent variable is leaki,t, the
and
leakage for a particular Form 8-K filing, weighted by
the propensity-score weight. The sample is limited to Form 8-K
filings within a window of [-120,-21] and [+21,+120]. The model
is given by the following linear specification:

where di is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 8-K filing is in
the treatment group; postt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if
the 8-K filing occurred after the director appointment date; and
ei,t is a random error term. The coefficient of interest is b3,
which captures the over-time difference in leakage between the
two groups. We cluster standard errors by firm-event to adjust
for serial correlation in leakage. T-statistics are provided below
correlation coefficients in parentheses. We use the following
indicators of statistical significance: *** indicates p < 0.01, **
indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.10.
82
The majority of securities filings related to settlement agreements specify
the nature of the activist director’s relationship, if any, with the activist. In addition, we found that the activist employee–appointees are typically senior executives of the activist, making identification of their relationship with the investor
straightforward. Directors who are not employees of the activist, by contrast, are
typically current or former senior executives in the target company’s industry,
making identification of their employment and expertise similarly straightforward.
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Leakage Leakage Leakage Leakage
Treatment x Post
0.0752**
(t-statistic)
(2.17)
Hedge Fund x Post
0.0994***
(t-statistic)
(2.92)
Not Hedge Fund x Post
-0.0225
(t-statistic)
(-0.27)
Employee-Director x
0.0760**
Post
(t-statistic)
(2.01)
Non-Employee-Director
0.0731
x Post
(t-statistic)
(1.28)
No Information-Sharing
0.1107**
Rule x Post
(t-statistic)
(2.34)
Information-Sharing
0.0631
Rule x Post
(t-statistic)
(1.17)
Observations
9,414
9,414
9,414
9,414

TABLE 6. INFORMATION LEAKAGE (ALTERNATIVE TRUNCATION
SPECIFICATION). In this Table, we estimate the difference in the
over-time change in leakage between the treatment and control
groups. We show the results of truncated regression models
(Long, 1997) in which the dependent variable is leaki,t, the
leakage for a particular Form 8-K filing, for those filings where
0 < leaki,t < 1. The sample is limited to Form 8-K filings within a
window of [-120,-21] and [+21,+120]. The model is given by the
following linear specification:
where di is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 8-K filing is in
a treatment group; postt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
8-K filing occurred after the director appointment date; xi,t is a
vector of time-varying covariates: the decile of the firm’s market
value, idiosyncratic volatility, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity
measure, and the log of the firm’s book-to-market ratio; each
as of the month preceding the Form 8-K filing, or current year
in the case of the book-to-market ratio, as well as filing-level
covariates: the filing length and fixed effects for item numbers;
and ei,t is a random error term. The coefficient of interest is b3,
which captures the over-time difference in leakage between the
two groups. We cluster standard errors by firm-event to adjust
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for serial correlation in leakage. T-statistics are provided below
correlation coefficients in parentheses. We use the following
indicators of statistical significance: *** indicates p < 0.01, **
indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.10.
Leakage
Leakage Leakage Leakage
Treatment x Post
0.2535***
(t-statistic)
(2.73)
Hedge Fund x Post
0.2701***
(t-statistic)
(2.68)
Not Hedge Fund x Post
0.2238
(t-statistic)
(0.85)
0.2406**
Employee-Director x
Post
(t-statistic)
(2.17)
Non-Employee0.2907*
Director x Post
(t-statistic)
(1.74)
0.4985***
No InformationSharing Rule x Post
(t-statistic)
(3.28)
Information-Sharing
0.0453
Rule x Post
(t-statistic)
(0.29)
Observations
23,002
23,002
23,002
23,002

In Tables 5 and 6, the bold faced entries across from
“Treatment x Post” show that settlement firms experience an
average increase of 7.5 (in Table 5) or 25 (in Table 6) percentage
points in leakage above that of the control firms over a fourmonth window following the appointment of the activist director(s) to the board.83 The variation in the two estimates is
driven by the different weighting and truncation procedure.
83
Does this effect persist over the long-term? We can think of at least two
reasons why leakage is unlikely to persist many months into the future. One is
that the activist hedge fund, having achieved its goal of appointing directors to the
target’s board, may swiftly bring about the desired financial or operating changes
and then shift its attention elsewhere. Activists typically sell their positions after
a holding period of around one year. A second possibility is, as suggested in the
Theoretical Appendix, that if the leakage effect is driven by illegal conduct, the
probability of detection may increase over time, thus deterring leakage increasingly as time progresses. We considered whether the effect we measure persists
over a longer one-year window (-365, +365) following the appointment of the
directors to the board. We estimated the same specification described above over
that longer period. Unlike the results from our short-term sample, we found that
the difference-in-difference coefficient is not significantly different when estimating leakage over a longer window following the activist intervention.
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The former estimate is smaller because it includes many observations of “negative” leakage (i.e., wrong-way trading), while the
latter excludes those cases via truncation. These two models
simply take different approaches to accounting for cases that
do not easily fit the “percentage of price change” interpretation
of the leakage ratios. In both specifications, this difference is
statistically significant at the 1% level, meaning the probability
that this result was obtained by random chance is less than
1%.
Similarly, firms that are targets of activist investors experience an increase in leakage of 9.94 percentage points (in Table
5) or 27.9 percentage points (in Table 6), on average, above that
of the control firms, over the four-month window following the
appointment of the activist director(s) to the board. As before,
the variation is driven by the difference in truncation. In both
specifications, this difference is statistically significant at the
1% level. On the other hand, the row labeled “Not Hedge Fund
x Post” shows that the estimated over-time increase in leakage
for firms that are the targets of non-hedge fund investors is
inconsistently estimated, ranging from -0.0225 to 22.4 percentage points. However, none of these estimates are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% or even 10% level. Thus, there is
a high probability the non-hedge fund estimates were obtained
by random chance alone.84 Our findings are consistent with
the conjecture that information leakage increases with the intervention of hedge fund activists in a way that differs meaningfully from interventions by other investors, but we reiterate
that this statistical finding does not establish illegal conduct or
a violation of Rule 10b-5.
Next, we compare the over-time difference in leakage between the control group and two treatment groups: those
where employees of the activist are appointed to the target’s
board pursuant to the settlement agreement and those where
the appointed directors are not employees of the activist. The
bold-faced row labeled “Employee Director Dummy x Post”
shows that settlements which provide for the appointment of at
least one director who is an employee of the acquiror experience an increase of 7.6 or 24 percentage points in leakage, on
average, above that of the control firms, over the four-month
window following the appointment of the activist director(s) to
the board. This difference is statistically significant at the 5%
84
However, an F-test does not indicate that the difference in these coefficients is statistically significant. An “F-test” is a statistical test of the hypothesis
that the difference in regression coefficients was caused by random chance alone.
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level. On the other hand, the row labeled “Not Employee Director Dummy x Post” shows that the estimated increase in leakage for settlements which provide solely for the appointment of
non-employee directors is statistically insignificant in the primary specification, and only marginally significant at the 10%
level in the truncated specification.85 Taken together, these
results suggest that the non-employee director estimates were
obtained by random chance alone. The only leakage result that
is consistently statistically meaningful is that of employee
directors.
Although the reason for this heterogeneity deserves closer
consideration, we offer several possibilities for further study.
First, to the extent that the mechanism producing the leakage
we observe is trading facilitated by directors, activist investor
employees—usually finance professionals—are more likely
than non-employees to have access either to (i) trading capital
of the magnitude necessary to produce the stock price movements that we observe, or (ii) professional traders willing to act
as their agents (presumably for a share of the profits). Second,
to the extent that the mechanism for disseminating confidential information is loose gossip, hedge fund employees (either
directors or fellow employees in contact with them) live in an
environment of traders where the value of such information is
well understood (and where reciprocal benefits and tips may be
expected in the future by those who tip today). We will call this
the “favor bank” explanation, as it suggests that there may be
norms of reciprocity observed by many in the financial world
who engage in such information sharing. Third, it is possible
that either the reputational loss associated with improper facilitation of informed trading or the acceptance of moral norms
that preclude participation in such trading is higher for nonemployees—typically industry experts and often current or former officers of large public companies—than for less visible
activist employees. Arguably, such experts and executives are
either more easily deterred or more morally inhibited. We do
not assert, however, that we have proven any of these
conjectures.
We now consider whether these post-settlement increases
in leakage differ with information-sharing provisions in the settlement agreement. As noted above, we classified each settlement agreement with respect to several information-sharing
provisions, including whether the agreement contains an ex85
As with the prior result, an F-test does not indicate that the difference in
these coefficients is statistically significant.
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press rule on information sharing, refers to an informationsharing rule in a separate confidentiality agreement, or refers
to a generic policy on information sharing. As before, we consider two treatment groups: those with either an express rule
on information sharing or a reference to an information-sharing rule in a separate confidentiality agreement and those without either of these provisions. In our primary specification, the
coefficient on the latter is twice as large as the former.86 In our
alternative specification, the agreements lacking a rule restriction on information sharing have nearly twelve times as much
leakage as those with a rule on information sharing, while the
statistical significance of the former is extremely high whereas
the latter is not even close to significant. In the alternative
specification, the standard statistical test (known as an “Ftest”) indicates that the difference in these coefficients is statistically significant.
In other words, the leakage difference correlates closely
with whether activist settlements contain either an express
rule on information sharing or a reference to an informationsharing rule in a separate confidentiality agreement. We do not
suggest that this correlation is causal—we are not claiming
that the presence of such a rule deters leakage. Rather, one
possible explanation for this difference may be that activists
differ in their willingness to share material, nonpublic information and the market can distinguish those more likely to maintain confidentiality (who also happen to be the ones most likely
to insert such a confidentiality provision in their settlement
agreements).
One general objection to our analysis thus far is that the
control group may not be sufficiently comparable to the treatment group(s), even with the propensity-score matching, because these control firms are not undergoing the kind of farreaching corporate change that takes place following a settlement agreement.87 This concern essentially states the relevant
counterfactual for our causal analysis: would information leakage have increased but for the appointment of directors pursuant to the settlement agreement or but for the enactment of
operational changes pursuant to the hedge fund’s demands?
The latter implies that the leakage effect we identify is caused
by hedge fund activism but not necessarily the settlement or
86
However, an F-test does not indicate that the difference in these coefficients is statistically significant.
87
We thank Lucian Bebchuk and Alon Brav for independently raising this
important concern.
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appointment of directors to the boardroom. This still raises
important policy concerns, but the mechanism is different.
We have taken this objection seriously and found two tests
by which to measure if it does indeed impact our results. First,
we utilize an alternative control group consisting of those firms
which experienced a Schedule 13-D filing but did not engage in
a settlement agreement. On average, these firms are undergoing operational change in response to hedge fund activism and
thus supply a counterfactual that more precisely isolates the
settlement itself (though at the cost of some statistical power,
as this sample is much smaller). The challenge is choosing the
relevant “settlement” date in these cases, as both the treatment
and control groups had a 13-D filing prior to the settlement.
Our primary approach is to add the median distance between a
13-D and settlement filing (148 calendar days) to this alternative control group’s 13-D filing date, though we also randomly
sampled a 13-D settlement date distance and obtained very
similar results. We apply the same propensity-score matching
as previously (again, obtaining balance across the covariates),
and present the results of our analysis with this alternative
control group in Table 7.
TABLE 7. INFORMATION LEAKAGE (13-D CONTROL GROUP). In this
Table, we estimate the difference in the over-time change in
leakage between the treatment and an alternative control
group consisting of firms subject to activist engagements that
did not result in a settlement, where the “activist director
appointment date” for the control firms is equal to the 13-D
date plus the median difference between the settlement and
13-D date in the treatment group. We show the results of OLS
regression models in which the dependent variable is leaki,t, the
and
leakage for a particular Form 8-K filing, weighted by
the propensity-score weight. The sample is limited to Form 8-K
filings within a window of [-120,-21] and [+21,+120]. The
model is given by the following linear specification:
where di is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 8-K filing is in
a treatment group (see below); postt is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if the 8-K filing occurred after the director appointment date; and ei,t is a random error term. The coefficient of
interest is b3, which captures the over-time difference in leakage between the two groups. We cluster standard errors by
firm-event to adjust for serial correlation in leakage. T-statistics are provided below correlation coefficients in parentheses.
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We use the following indicators of statistical significance: ***
indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p <
0.10.
Treatment x Post
(t-statistic)
Hedge Fund x Post
(t-statistic)
Not Hedge Fund x Post
(t-statistic)
Employee-Director x
Post
(t-statistic)
Non-Employee-Director
x Post
(t-statistic)
No InformationSharing Rule x Post
(t-statistic)
Information-Sharing
Rule x Post
(t-statistic)
Observations

Leakage
0.1099***
(2.59)

Leakage

Leakage

Leakage

0.1362***
(3.25)
0.0027
(0.03)
0.1101**
(2.44)
0.1096*
(1.76)
0.1012*
(1.68)
0.1434***

5,364

5,364

5,364

(2.71)
5,364

Table 7 shows that the results with this alternative control
group are generally consistent with our prior findings. The
difference-in-differences coefficient for the treatment group is
positive, statistically significant, and of a similar magnitude as
the prior control group. There is a large numerical difference
between the hedge fund and non-hedge fund groups, just as
before. The employee-director group is statistically significant,
whereas the non-employee-director group is not. The only difference is that the prior no information-sharing rule finding
reverses direction in this alternative control group
specification.
To further shed light on the possibility that information
leakage is driven by the activist engagement rather than the
appointment of directors pursuant to the settlement, we look
within the treatment group and compare information leakage
after the Schedule 13-D filing (but before the appointment of
nominee directors) and leakage after the appointment of these
directors pursuant to the settlement. The latter period allows
us to isolate the additional impact of the director appointment
as a possible conduit for information leakage. Specifically, we
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compare leakage for Form 8-Ks filed between two periods: (1) a
“pre” period that begins seven days after the Schedule 13-D
filing and ends seven days before the director appointment to
the board pursuant to the settlement and (2) a “post” period
that begins seven days after the director appointment and ends
120 days after. In this specification, we simply compare leakage between these two periods. The results are given in Table
8, which contains a column for each of the treatment groups
considered thus far: all settlements, hedge-fund only, employee-director only, and no information-sharing only.
TABLE 8. INFORMATION LEAKAGE: AFTER 13-D (BUT BEFORE
APPOINTMENT) VS. AFTER APPOINTMENT. In this Table, we estimate
the difference in information leakage following the 13-D filing
to leakage following the appointment of directors pursuant to a
settlement for the treatment group only. Specifically, we
compare leakage between two periods: a “pre” and “post”
period, defined as follows:
Pre = [13-D Filing + 7 days, Director Appointment − 7 days]
Post = [Director Appointment + 7 days, Director Appointment +
120 days]
We show the results of OLS regression models in which the
dependent variable is leaki,t, the leakage for a particular Form
. The model is given by the follow8-K filing, weighted by
0
ing linear specification:

lrLs,t I

where postt is an indicator variable equal to 1, if the 8-K filing
occurred after the director appointment date; and ei,t is a random error term. The coefficient of interest is b1, which captures
the over-time difference in leakage between the 13-D and settlement date. We cluster standard errors by firm-event to adjust for serial correlation in leakage. T-statistics are provided
below correlation coefficients in parentheses. We use the following indicators of statistical significance: *** indicates p <
0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.10.
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All
Hedge
Employee- No InformationSettlement Fund Only
Director
Sharing
Only
Provisions Only
0.0533** 0.0741***
0.0488*
0.0651
(2.22)
(2.86)
(1.65)
(1.51)

Post

(Intercept)

Observations

0.6672***
(49.59)

0.6673***
(44.89)

0.6789***
(45.42)

0.6723***
(32.13)

7,411

5,758

4,744

3,007

As Table 8 shows, there is an increase in information leakage from the first period (between the Schedule 13-D filing to
just before the appointment) to the second period (following
just after the appointment of the activist director). This increase is statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level in two of
the four specifications, and at the 10% level in another. The
magnitude of the increase is roughly on the order of 5-7 percentage points, or 8-11% of the constant term. These results
provide further evidence that the increase in leakage is not
driven solely by the activist engagement per se, but seems to be
following the appointment of the directors to the board pursuant to the settlement agreement.
F.

Options Trading

A possible rejoinder to the foregoing evidence of informed
trading is that much of the communication between a lead
activist fund and its allies may be innocuous and immaterial.
For example, a sophisticated trader may ask the activist fund
“How is your campaign at XYZ Industries going?” and receive
the non-specific response: “Great! We are making real progress.” This response may influence the sophisticated trader to
buy, but it is probably legally immaterial. Still, the problem
with this explanation as a rebuttal to our view that informed
trading is occurring is that the sophisticated trader needs to
know with some precision when material information will reach
and affect the market. For example, such a trader could not
sensibly buy a thirty-day option on XYZ Industries, based on
the above general assurance, because the sophisticated trader
would not know from it when market-moving news will reach
the market.
For an informed trader, options are the most efficient way
to trade, giving a greater return at a lower cost. Indeed, a
number of studies have established that informed traders are
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active in the options market88 and that options prices do predict future stock returns.89 For our purposes, it is particularly
useful to focus on how informed traders trade in the options
market. The best evidence here is that they prefer to take long
positions only in anticipation of unscheduled news releases
and that they avoid trading on scheduled news events (such as
earnings releases).90 Form 8-K filings are, by definition, unscheduled news releases (which must generally be filed within
four business days after a defined event occurs). Thus, if we
find profitable trading in the options market based on trades
entered into prior to a Form 8-K filing, this would be consistent
with the general pattern of informed trading in the options
market. But given the short timing requirements for the filing
of a Form 8-K, a trader cannot expect to profit from thirty-day
options based only on vague, immaterial gossip. One must
trade quickly to profit from advance knowledge of the content of
a prospective Form 8-K filing, and this requires that the trader
know approximately when the announcement will occur. Further, a general sense that things are going well (or poorly) does
not imply that there will soon be any filing (and certainly not a
Form 8-K filing) that will move the market price. To sum up,
the trader must have hard and specific information (including
as to the announcement date) to profit from trading on options.
In that light, we examined whether there is greater trading
in stock options of target firms following an activist settlement
agreement. Because there may be hundreds or even
thousands of stock option contracts written on any given firm’s
stock over time, it was necessary to employ a specially focused
form of analysis. We downloaded options data from the OptionsMetrics IvyDB database only for firms which executed an
activist settlement and divided these options into two groups,
limiting our analysis to a window of one year on either side of
the settlement agreement.
The first group consists of options written on settlement
firms which “overlap” a Form 8-K disclosure. By “overlap,” we
88
See Jun Pan & Allen M. Poteshman, The Information in Option Volume for
Future Stock Prices, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 871 (2006); Martijn Cremers, Andrew Fodor
& David Weinbaum, How Do Informed Option Traders Trade? Option Trading
Activity, News Releases, and Stock Return Predictability, (last revised Sept. 21,
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2544344 [https:/
/perma.cc/4JJM-VDBB] (surveying literature on informed trading in options
market).
89
See Martijn Cremers & David Weinbaum, Deviations from Put-Call Parity
and Stock Return Predictability, 45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 335, 337 (2010).
90
See Cremers, Fodor & Weinbaum, supra note 88, at 24. Earnings releases
are both scheduled and generally released on a Form 10-Q.
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mean that the option price is quoted before the Form 8-K filing
but the option expires after the Form 8-K was subsequently
filed. For example, suppose that the Form 8-K is filed on January 10. An option that is quoted on January 1 and expires on
January 31 would “overlap” the Form 8-K. An option that expires on January 9 would not overlap the Form 8-K; neither
would any option that is quoted on January 11. The second
group consists of options written on settlement firms which do
not overlap a Form 8-K disclosure.
An increase in trading volume for options that overlap a
Form 8-K disclosure is consistent with trading on the basis of
material nonpublic information. On average, these options increase in value upon the filing of the Form 8-K disclosure.
Then, we employ regression analysis to compare the difference
in trading volume between overlapping and non-overlapping
options, before and after the directors are appointed to the
board pursuant to the settlement agreement. We present these
“difference in differences” results in Table 9.
TABLE 9. EFFECTS OF ACTIVIST SETTLEMENTS ON OPTIONS TRADING
(TREATMENT ONLY). In this Table, we estimate the difference in
the over-time change in options trading between options which
overlap a Form 8-K filing and those that do not overlap a Form
8-K filing. This Table reports the results of a difference-indifferences specification, which we estimate by ordinary least
squares as follows:

where voli,t is the trading volume in option i as of month t; di is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if an option overlaps a Form 8-K
disclosure; postt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if month t is
after the director appointment date; xi,t is a vector of timevarying option covariates: option strike price, delta, gamma,
vega, and implied volatility; fi is a fixed effect for firm i; and ei,t is
a random error term. The coefficient of interest is b3, which
captures the over-time difference in log trading volume between
the two groups. We cluster standard errors by option to address serial correlation in trading volume. We use the following
indicators of statistical significance: *** indicates p < 0.01, **
indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.10.
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Log of
Trading
Volume
(no controls)

Overlapping
(Difference from
Non-Overlapping)
(t-statistic)
Post (Difference
from Pre)
(t-statistic)
Overlapping x
Post (Difference
in Differences)
(t-statistic)
Strike Price (Log)
(t-statistic)
Option Delta
(t-statistic)
Option Gamma
(t-statistic)
Option Vega
(t-statistic)
Implied Volatility
(t-statistic)
(Intercept)
(t-statistic)
Observations
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Log of
Trading
Volume
(more
controls)
-0.2481***

Log of
Trading
Volume
(all controls)

-0.8144***

Log of
Trading
Volume
(some
controls)
-0.8178***

(-32.69)
-0.4264***

(-33.36)
-0.5230***

(-9.11)
-0.3921***

(-8.58)
-0.4203***

(-15.95)
0.2318***

(-19.34)
0.2780***

(-14.39)
0.1503***

(-15.47)
0.1685***

(6.84)

(8.27)
-0.4942***
(-15.14)
0.2763***
(15.37)

(4.66)
-0.0575*
(-1.82)
0.3289***
(19.96)
1.8129***
(23.41)
-0.0592***
(-32.43)

4.1628***
(199.57)
251,450

9.2969***
(27.26)
251,450

4.5731***
(13.76)
251,450

(5.25)
0.2791***
(7.67)
0.3371***
(20.56)
2.0393***
(25.41)
-0.0574***
(-31.77)
1.2712***
(18.42)
0.5585
(1.41)
251,450

-0.2329***

In Table 9, the bold-faced row labeled “Treatment x Post
(Difference in Differences)” shows that settlement firms experience an over-time increase of 16-23 log points in trading volume, on average, of options that overlap Form 8-K filings, as
compared to those that do not overlap Form 8-K filings. This
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. This evidence is consistent with the conjectures that tippees had specific information and knew approximately when it would be
released to the market.
G.

Effect on Bid-Ask Spreads

Next, we consider whether bid-ask spreads widen following
activist settlements that lead to the appointment of directors to
the target company’s board, consistent with the theoretical predictions described in this Article. To do so, we obtained
monthly bid-ask spreads from CRSP for each of the stocks in
our treatment and control groups, following the same method

432

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:381

as discussed above for calculating the “director appointment
date” for each control group. For consistency with the leakage
analysis, we exclude a 21-day window immediately preceding
and following the settlement (though our results change very
little if these days are included). To ensure our results are not
driven by differences in bid-ask spreads arising far from the
settlement, we limit the sample to monthly bid-ask spreads
within short windows around the settlement date: 90, 120, 150
and 180 calendar days. Table 10 presents the results.
TABLE 10. ACTIVIST SETTLEMENTS AND BID-ASK SPREADS. In this
Table, we estimate the difference in the over-time change in
bid-ask spreads between the treatment and the control groups.
This Table reports the results of a difference-in-differences
specification, which we estimate by ordinary least squares as
follows, weighting by the propensity-score weight:
where spreadi,t is the bid-ask spread divided by the closing
price of firm i’s stock at month t; di is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the firm appointed an activist director pursuant to a
settlement agreement; postt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
month t is after the director appointment date; and ei,t is a
random error term. The coefficient of interest is b3, which captures the over-time difference in bid—ask spreads between the
two groups. We cluster standard errors by firm to address
serial correlation in spreads.
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[-90, -21] [-120, -21] [-180, -21] [-270, -21]
vs.
vs.
vs.
vs.
[+21, +90] [+21, +120] [+21, +180] [+21, +270]
Treatment
(t-statistic)

-0.0023*
(-1.68)

-0.0021*
(-1.73)

-0.0014
(-1.26)

-0.0011
(-1.16)

Post
(t-statistic)

-0.0029** -0.0025*** -0.0022*** -0.0020***
(-2.55)
(-2.58)
(-2.62)
(-2.77)

Treatment x Post 0.0033** 0.0034***
(t-statistic)
(2.58)
(2.97)

0.0033***
(3.16)

0.0035***
(3.67)

(Intercept)

Observations

0.0086***
(7.02)

0.0083***
(8.06)

0.0076***
(8.47)

0.0074***
(9.51)

9,252

13,195

20,910

32,576

In Table 10, the bold-faced row labeled “Treatment x Post
(Difference in Differences)” shows that settlement firms experience an over-time average increase of 0.33-0.35 percentage
points in the bid-ask spread for each individual trade. This
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level in most
specifications. To get a sense for the magnitude of this effect,
we multiply the monthly raw bid-ask spread for each firm’s
stock by the number of shares traded in that month and obtain
an average difference-in-differences increase of $43,325 per
firm-month-event in the “Treatment x Post” group for the sixmonth specification [-180, -21] vs. [+21, +180]. Multiplying by
n=8,034 firm-month-events in the “Treatment x Post” group
yields a total approximate increase of $348 million in bid-ask
spreads over this six-month period window.
Finally, we note that, although the point estimates for this
difference may seem relatively small, as Glosten & Putnins
point out,91 the social welfare losses associated with an effect
like this one can be magnified by the downstream effects of
91
See Lawrence R. Glosten & Talis J. Putnins, Welfare Costs of Informed
Trade, (Aug. 23, 2016), https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=62208
70090290711041010140650160110240220420100140330200880710760770
910960910831110050111180300020071130080880920000731111120900
01006043079004121101020117093079102054007078095080003082007074
113072119126024108105066123127100069075102117026025092118096&
EXT=pdf [https://perma.cc/C8U4-DE7N].
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expanded bid-ask spreads in hindering—or making excessively
expensive—mutually beneficial transactions. This result is
consistent with the possibility that, whatever the private benefits obtained by directors or others following activist settlements, these benefits come with a corresponding social cost:
wider bid-ask spreads that potentially deprive other investors
of transactions in the company’s stock that would otherwise
occur. While we recognize that there is substantial uncertainty
regarding the precise magnitude of this social cost, our findings
do suggest that the use of activist settlement agreements—and
the access to the boardroom that comes with them—carries a
cost for public-company investors.
III
IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS AND POSSIBLE REFORMS
A.

Informed Trading and Hedge Fund Activism

What is driving hedge fund activism? Is it just that activist
funds are maximizing value for their fellow shareholders? Or is
there more? In a simple model of activism, activists’ funds gain
or lose based on the stock prices of the target firms in which
they invest. If the activist fund buys stock in the target firm,
pushes for changes in its operations, staff or business model,
and, in response, the target’s stock price rises, few would deny
that the activist benefitted the other shareholders. But if activist engagements culminating in the appointment of fundnominated directors are accompanied by informed trading
(whether or not unlawful), then activism is receiving a second
source of profit—in effect a special subsidy from informed trading. Thus, some activist engagements may be motivated (at
least on the margin) not simply by efficiency considerations,
but by the knowledge that the appointment of a director will
give them access to material, nonpublic information. If this
subsidy from informed trading is significant, it should logically
cause an increase in the number of activist engagements, even
if these engagements did not produce value for the other shareholders. To illustrate, suppose an activist fund expends
$100,000 (which is not reimbursed) over a six-month period
and eventually appoints two directors to the target’s board.
Assume further that the stock price moves up and down in a
volatile fashion over the six-month period following their appointment to the board, but ultimately no long-term increase in
the target’s stock price results. Shareholders in this target thus
gain nothing (and probably bear some costs in the form of the
legal expenses incurred by their company and the diverted ex-
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ecutive time). Assume finally that the activist (or its allies)
make $500,000 in profits from informed stock trading in the
secondary market over this interval. As a result, the entire
transaction produces no gain for shareholders generally (and
probably produces some social waste), but it does yield a significant private benefit. When private gains cause public waste
the result is socially inefficient.
The bottom line is that pervasive access to material, nonpublic information gives rise to an invisible subsidy to activism
that logically should both inflate the rate of activist engagements and encourage (on the margin) at least some otherwise
inefficient engagements (such as the one discussed above) that
do not generate value for the other shareholders (but do generate profits for the informed traders). To be sure, this does not
mean that hedge fund activism is itself undesirable or inefficient, but only that it is receiving a perverse subsidy.
Still, how is this subsidy received and allocated? Normally,
the activist signs a standstill agreement with the target firm.92
But this may be less a barrier than it first appears, for several
reasons. First, standstill agreements generally do not prevent
short selling or trading in put and call options (which are the
least costly way of exploiting material nonpublic information).
Second, although private settlement agreements vary substantially in the restrictions they impose, most do not expressly bar
trading by the activist’s employees or agents, and relatively few
require the target company’s consent to the sharing of confi-

92
As noted earlier, the Bebchuk study finds that a standstill provision in
settlement agreements is “almost universal.” Bebchuk et al., supra note 14, at 6.
Still, the standstill level may be above the current level of the activist fund’s
ownership (thus allowing it to buy more). See supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
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dential information.93 Nonetheless, other factors appear to dissuade the hedge fund from such trading.94
Even if the activist fund does not itself trade in the target’s
stock, its employees and allies may feel less constrained and
might trade through hidden agents. Still, these agreements
also do not typically make the activist liable for the trading by
their employees, advisors, or other tippees; instead, they often
only recite a formula that effectively states that each side
knows the law.95 In contrast, the directors nominated by activists are probably the group least likely to trade, both because of
their visibility and clear fiduciary status and because of Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which requires public
disclosure through a filing with the SEC of purchases and sales
93
From our review of settlement agreements, the vast majority do not explicitly prohibit the directors or the hedge fund from trading in either options or the
common stock of the target firm (although some do restrict trading in any derivatives of the target’s stock, including put and call options, and some do restrict
short selling). That said, there are several factors which make it difficult for the
hedge fund itself to profit from informed trading on open-market stock trades.
First, there is generally an effective upper bound on the amount of stock the
activist may acquire. Many settlement agreements contain a standstill percentage somewhat above the current level of the activist’s ownership, which higher
level the activist agrees to not to exceed. Even where a settlement does not specify
a standstill percentage, very few activists are willing to cross the 10% ownership
threshold, in part because of the added requirements and penalties imposed by
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, which apply to any 10% holder regardless of whether it has a nominee on the board. In addition, the 10% level is
avoided because it is often “socially acceptable” to put a poison pill in place with a
10% threshold, as owning more than 10% is generally viewed as a prelude to a
takeover/sale attempt. Also, if the hedge fund increases its position in the target
by more than 1%, it is required to amend its Schedule 13-D and promptly disclose
this increased holding. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (2018). This may attract
undesired scrutiny if the activist is trading on nonpublic information. For these
reasons, activists are unlikely to directly increase their long positions substantially after signing the standstill, though such trades can obviously still occur
within and up to these bounds.
94
See discussion supra at note 93.
95
Frequently, the settlement agreement will provide: “Each of the Investors
hereby acknowledges that it is aware that the United States securities laws prohibit any person who has material, nonpublic information with respect to the
Company from transacting in the securities of the Company or from communicating such information to any other person under circumstances in which it is
reasonably foreseeable that such person is likely to transact in such securities.”
Dillard’s Inc., Information to be Included in Statements Filed Pursuant to Rule 13d1(a) and Amendments Thereto Filed Pursuant to Rule 13d-2(a) (Schedule 13-D) 40
(Apr. 1, 2008). Here, three activist funds and their affiliates state that they recognize what the law requires, but make no guarantees or contractual commitments.
At a minimum, a large number of persons are here acquiring material, nonpublic
information. We have found this format to be widely used. In our view, these are
self-serving provisions that permit the activist investor to express shock and
dismay (but incur no liability) if one of its advisors or employees later misbehaves
and tips others.
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by directors, and requires the director to surrender any “shortswing” profits to the corporation.96
More plausible then is trading by tippees of the activist or
its employees. If the hedge fund or its employees share material, nonpublic information acquired from access to the target’s
board with the fellow members of its “wolf pack” of allies, the
trading by these allies would be harder to detect and legally
more difficult to prosecute. Alternatively, employees of the
hedge fund may just enjoy gossiping with professional colleagues, possibly anticipating that their sharing of information
will earn them reciprocal favors in the future. This implicit
view of Wall Street as a giant “favor bank” seems consistent
with the facts of some recent cases, including Newman, where
tippees working for one hedge fund have shared nonpublic information with colleagues in other funds.97 Finally, under
some circumstances, the activist fund’s tipping might be perfectly lawful. For example, if the activist fund secures a promise of confidentiality from another investor, a SEC rule permits
it to share confidential, nonpublic information with that investor, and the tipper may sometimes have a legitimate corporate
justification for such information sharing.98 If the activist obtains such a promise, it can later claim that it acted entirely
96
See 18 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2018). Section 16(b) requires a director to file Form
4 and Form 5 with the SEC. Form 4 must be filed by “the end of the second
business day following the day on which the subject transaction has been executed.” See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(g)(1) (2018). Moreover, upon the acquisition or
disposition of 1% or more of the common, the activist must file an amendment to
Schedule 13-D listing all trades in the common that occurred within the past 60
days. And any activist that becomes subject to Section 16—either through 10%
ownership or having an employee on the company board—must file trades on
Form 4. Thus, a great deal of an activist’s trading activity in the stock will be
publicly reported, especially where the fund has an employee on the board. In our
dataset, we found that there was little to no suspicious trading reported on either
the Schedule 13-D/As or Form 4s, strengthening the conclusion that activists or
their employees are more likely to be tipping rather than trading directly on
material nonpublic information.
97
In United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 448 (2d Cir. 2014), the defendants were fourth and fifth level “remote” tippees and the information moved from
employees in one fund to those in another fund, seemingly as a gift. Although
Newman is no longer good law in the light of later decisions, the fact pattern
illustrates how information flows within the industry and suggests that a norm of
reciprocity may encourage information sharing.
98
For example, if the activist fund is trying to organize a proxy contest it may
be in the best interests of the fund’s investors for its managers to share information about its plans with prospective allies to maximize its leverage over the target
firm. The goal of winning a majority vote in a proxy fight requires it to search for
allies and explain its reasoning. Regulation Fair Disclosure explicitly recognizes
that material nonpublic information may be shared with those who agree to
preserve its confidentiality. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii) (2018) (providing that
Regulation FD does not apply to a disclosure to a person “who expressly agrees to
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lawfully and was “shocked” to learn that its tippee acted
unlawfully.99
Ambiguity surrounds the potential motivations for an activist fund to share confidential information acquired through
an employee serving on a target board. Sometimes, it could be,
as just noted, an expectation of reciprocity (“I will tip you on my
deals, if you tip me on yours”). Sometimes, it may just be
casual gossip among traders seeking to impress each other
with their knowledge. Still another possibility is that such
sharing could be an attempt to hold together a coalition of
funds for a longer period. If the lead activist fund can assemble
a coalition (or “wolf pack” in the popular parlance) of funds
holding somewhere between 15% and 20% of the target’s voting
stock, it would have a considerable advantage over the target’s
management in any subsequent proxy fight. Facing such odds,
target management may prefer to settle than to fight. But why
do these allies join this coalition or remain in it? Of course,
they could believe in the lead activist’s strategy. Another possibility is that they will support the activist in return for access to
material, nonpublic information. Here, it is important to understand that the target firm’s stock price does not normally
increase significantly after the initial price bump following the
activist’s disclosure of its position with its initial Schedule 13-D
filing. One empirical study shows that a measurable price increase after this filing usually occurs only if there is a subsequent “successful outcome” (i.e., a merger or sale
transaction).100 This implies that the other members of the
activist’s coalition who buy prior to the initial Schedule 13-D
filing may have a reduced incentive to continue to hold the
maintain the disclosed information in confidence”). Of course, those who promise
confidentiality may not comply (or they may tip others who do not comply).
99
We have found examples among the settlement agreements we surveyed
where, to share confidential information, the activist fund only had to advise its
tippee that the information that it provided was confidential. See supra note 56.
If such a tippee then traded, the tipper could claim surprise and dismay. To be
sure, the tipper’s expression of shock at trading by the tippee may not be convincing, but the burden is on the prosecution to show that the tipper expected the
tippee to disregard its confidentiality obligation.
100
See Marco Becht et al., Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International
Study, (Last revised on May 22, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2376271 [https://perma.cc/DP36-FUJF] (finding that stock price of
the target only appreciates significantly after the initial jump on the filing of the
Schedule 13-D if there is a “successful outcome,” such as a merger, takeover bid
or major asset sale). Because these transactions are uncertain and often delayed,
the activist’s allies in the “wolf pack” could decide to bail out and sell their shares
if they do not continue to receive encouraging advice or some other benefit (such
as nonpublic material information) that motivates them to hold their shares.
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target’s stock after that Schedule 13-D filing, particularly if the
prospect of such a merger or sale outcome is uncertain or
diminishing. Thus, absent some other incentive, these allies
might logically sell their individual positions after the initial
stock bump (and move on to a new target). But access to material, nonpublic information is an additional and powerful incentive that can motivate these allies to hold onto their
positions in the target (and thus enhance the activist’s voting
power). Also, it is logical to anticipate that there will be marketmoving announcements (positive or negative) in the near future, given the activist’s announced plans.
Indeed, if access to nonpublic material information is a
likely consequence of joining the activist’s coalition, there may
be cases in which activist investors join a coalition, even
though they doubt the wisdom of the lead activist’s proposals.
If so, this may imply in turn that a moral-hazard problem could
arise, as the supporters of activist engagements may not truly
need to evaluate carefully the merits of the activist’s proposals
if these trading gains are also available.
To be clear, we do not know that investors think or behave
in this way. But we do know that someone is trading actively
and disproportionately once a hedge fund insider goes on the
board. Equally important, we know that the market seems to
expect such trading, which is why the bid/ask spread widens
on the appointment of a hedge fund employee to the board. To
ignore the market’s standard reaction is to wear a self-imposed
blindfold.
To sum up, even if we do not know whether illegality is
occurring, we have evidence that informed trading is common
and thus that a dubious subsidy may fuel hedge fund activism
on the margin. The gains to those engaged in informed trading
are matched by an agency cost to other shareholders: the
widening of the bid/ask spread. In fairness, one cannot yet
reliably estimate the size of this subsidy. All that is clear is that
the desire for access to nonpublic information is strong and
could motivate some to join an activist coalition and support
the lead activist regardless of their view of the quality of the
lead activist’s plans. Access to nonpublic information could be
the social cement that holds together an otherwise unstable
coalition.
B.

Preempting the Majority’s Preference

The heyday of hedge fund activism began a decade or so
ago when traditional institutional investors (who are typically
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diversified, often indexed, and generally passive) began to support the proposals advanced by activist hedge funds. That support enabled hedge funds typically holding less than 10% of an
issuer’s stock to compel management to negotiate with them
for fear of losing a hostile proxy fight in which the diversified
institutional investors would vote to support the undiversified
hedge funds.
But more recently that alliance has come under strain. A
fissure has clearly developed between hedge fund activists and
an institutional investor community that fears the short-term
bias of activism. As noted earlier, the three largest institutional
shareholders are Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street,
which collectively hold 18.4% of the stock in S&P 500 companies.101 Over recent years, “passive investors” have greatly increased their share in the ownership of large U.S. corporations
such that the top ten institutional shareholders, most of whom
fall into this “passive” category, now hold roughly 32% of the
stock in S&P 500 companies.102 Unlike activist hedge funds,
these institutions have regularly expressed disagreement with
the goals of activists. In particular, the CEOs of BlackRock and
Vanguard sent much-publicized letters in 2015 to their fellow
CEOs at large-cap companies urging them not to take the
short-term view advocated by activist hedge funds.103 Then in
2016, these institutions and others agreed with major corporations on statements of corporate governance principles that
sought to shift the focus away from short-term results.104
101

LAZARD (2018), supra note 4, at 8.
Id.
103
See Laurence D. Fink, Larry Fink’s 2016 Corporate Governance Letter to
CEOs, BLACKROCK (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-no/
literature/press-release/2016-larry-fink-ceo-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY2ZL9PX]; Laurence D. Fink, Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose,
BLACKROCK (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-no/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/2VWZ-PS4E]; F. William
McNabb III, An Open Letter to Directors of Public Companies Worldwide, VANGUARD
(Aug. 31, 2017), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/governance-letter-to-companies.pdf [https://perma.cc/J82B-2E8B]; F. William McNabb
III, Letter to the Independent Leaders of the Boards of Directors of the Vanguard
Funds’ Largest Portfolio Holdings, VANGUARD (Feb. 27, 2015), https://
about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/CEO_Letter_03_02_ext.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QZU8-GAWZ].
104
The leading example is “Commonsense Corporate Governance Principles,”
a statement adopted in July 2016 by a coalition of nineteen CEOs (including
Warren Buffett and the CEOs of General Motors and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.)
and the CEOs of several major investment firms (including BlackRock). See Commonsense Corporate Governance Principles, GOVERNANCEPRINCIPLES.ORG, http://
www.governanceprinciples.org; [https://perma.cc/BQ9G-5Y39] (last visited Oct.
29, 2018); see also Yaron Nili, Out of Sight, out of Mind: The Case for Improving
102
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Later in 2016, State Street Global Advisors (SSGA) shifted
the focus from substantive goals to procedures, releasing an
elaborate statement criticizing the willingness of corporations
engaged by activists to enter into quick and private settlements
with activists without first seeking the input of long-term
shareholders (such as, of course, themselves).105 SSGA was
clearly on to something here; it saw that risk-averse managers
would rather concede two directors to activists than take the
risk of a hostile proxy contest and possibly a humiliating defeat. As SSGA pointed out, less than 10% of board seats conceded in activist campaigns in 2015 and 2016 had resulted
from a proxy contest (as opposed to 34% in 2014);106 the other
seats were resolved through private negotiations between the
company and the activists.
SSGA objected to the process surrounding these agreements even more than to their substance (which they saw as
inducing the company to focus on the short-term). Procedurally, SSGA and its clients believed themselves to be disenfranchised by these private settlements. In its 2016 statement,
SSGA made several specific proposals as to the duration of
such agreements, the requisite holding period for shares held
by activists, the pledging of activist shares, and the need for
fund-nominated directors to resign in certain circumstances.107 Procedurally, SSGA announced they would engage
with companies ex post to evaluate these settlements. Unfortunately, this resembles locking the barn door after the horse has
Director Independence Disclosure, 43 J. CORP. L. 35, 37 (2017) (discussing this
coalition statement).
105
See Protecting Long-Term Shareholder Interests in Activist Engagements,
supra note 5, at 2.
106
Id.
107
Specifically, SSGA objected to the following:
Duration. SSGA estimated that the duration of most settlement
agreements ran from six to eighteen months, and it suggested that
the agreements continue for a longer period (but it did not specify
the proposed duration).
Share Holding Periods. SSGA argued that “an activist firm should
be required to hold its shares for long periods from the date of the
settlement to align them with longer-termed shareholders.” Id. at 2.
Minimum Ownership Thresholds. SSGA objected to reduction of the
activist’s stake in the target and asked companies to require directors nominated by activists to tender their resignations if the activists’ ownership level fell below a required minimum threshold.
Restrictions on Pledging. SSGA would limit both short sales and
pledging of shares by activists, conduct which it said could endanger the company’s stock price.
Executive Compensation. SSGA objected to using earnings per
share as the primary determinant of CEO compensation.
See Id.
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been stolen. Once a financial engineering strategy has been
undertaken or activist directors appointed, these steps are not
easily reversed.
Thus, although SSGA’s critique won much applause, it did
not outline a feasible strategy for the future and managements
engaged by activists would predictably continue to take the
course of least resistance and settle privately. Accordingly, the
next Part will focus on feasible strategies, both to protect the
long-term shareholder from disenfranchisement and to reduce
the subsidy that informed trading may be providing to fuel
activism.
C.

Practical Reforms

Two basic problems have been identified to this point: (1)
Informed trading may represent a hidden subsidy for activism,
which could inflate (on the margin) the rate of activism and
justify support for activist proposals of dubious merit; and (2)
Long-term shareholders (largely diversified pension and mutual funds, but also exchange traded funds) may be disenfranchised if risk-averse managements would rather privately
settle with the activist than undertake a risky fight or enter into
broader negotiations with all the shareholders. On the assumption that legislation is unlikely (and Congress dysfunctional), this Part will focus on self-help reforms and possible
SEC rules on the premise that the least drastic means should
be preferred.
1.

Protecting Against Disenfranchisement

Let’s start with a realistic assumption: once an activist
appears and “engages” a target company, that company’s management cannot be trusted to side with the majority of the
shareholders. Management wants to avoid a costly public
proxy fight that it could lose and that would likely result in its
eventual ouster. Thus, it is prepared to reach a weak, Neville
Chamberlain-like compromise in which it will offer two seats on
its board for “peace in our time.” In reality, much as in Neville
Chamberlain’s case, management seldom gets the peace it
sought because the appointment of activist directors is regularly followed by the departure of the CEO within a year or
two.108 Still, management can hope, and so they settle.
108
A study by FTI Consulting in 2016 found that CEO turnover when activist
nominees gain board seats was 34.1% and 55.1% over the one and two-year
period, respectively, following the board appointments. The normal CEO turnover
rates are 16.6% and 30.9% over one and two-year periods, respectively. See
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Corporate managers also have more reason to fear hedge
fund activists than diversified investors, even if the latter hold
more stock. This is because undiversified hedge funds hold a
small portfolio (in terms of number of companies held), but
take large positions in each, tend to focus on only one or two
campaigns at a time, and have shown in the past that they will
undertake the costs of a proxy fight. In contrast, diversified
investors typically own smaller stakes in hundreds of stocks,
have modest staffs, and are unlikely to take action with respect
to an individual stock that represents only a small proportion
of their portfolio. They may vote for or against the activist, but
they are reluctant to incur costs.
In this light, it is impractical to expect even an SSGA to
take a seat on any of the hundreds of boards that have reason
to fear an activist attack in the near future. SSGA does not
have sufficient qualified staff to cover the entire corporate waterfront and monitor closely all the companies in its portfolio.
Indeed, even if a corporation were to ask SSGA to place a representative on its board (in order to signal the corporation’s willingness to resist activists), SSGA (or a similar firm) might
logically decline because the presence of an SSGA employee on
a corporation’s board could restrict its ability to sell that stock
(for fear of insider trading liability). Passive investors are passive because they logically prefer liquidity to control.109
What then can we realistically expect of diversified institutional investors? Here are two possibilities: First, investors,
such as SSGA and BlackRock, who fear they are being disenfranchised by private settlements could form (with other similarly-minded institutions) a steering committee and assemble a
team of outside directors (who are not their employees) that
they could seek to place on corporate boards in the event of an
activist attack. This would take some advance preparation, but
the effort and expense could be shared among the dozen (or
more) institutions participating in such a committee. This
committee could contact the corporation at the outset of an
activist campaign to suggest either its own nominees or its
desire to be involved in the settlement process. Some corporaSonali Basak & Beth Jinks, Activist Investors Double Chance of CEO Exits, Study
Shows, BLOOMBERG (Sep. 21, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-09-21/activist-investors-double-chance-of-ceo-exits-studyshows [https://perma.cc/D59P-VM2P].
109
One of the authors has made this argument at considerable length elsewhere. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor
as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991). Hedge Funds, being relatively undiversified, are an exception to this generalization.
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tions would not welcome this development (as it would complicate their negotiations), but others might see it as giving
management more negotiating leverage. This committee would
have no authority to bind its members and would act only
when it had the support of a majority of its members.
Second, diversified investors, working with ISS or a similar
body, could adopt a shareholder-approved bylaw that would
preclude board action either to expand the board’s size or elect
persons to vacancies on the board under certain circumstances. For example, such a bylaw might seek to restrict such
board action in cases where a requisite percentage of the shareholders objected. Consider then a bylaw that applied only if,
after an activist filed a Schedule 13-D or otherwise “engaged”
the company, shareholders representing a larger ownership
stake than that announced by the activist in its Schedule 13-D
were to file a written demand with the corporation within a
specified period, asking the board not to settle with the activist
by appointing its nominees. In effect, such a bylaw would bar
private settlements and require that the matter be settled instead by a shareholder vote at the annual meeting (unless a
majority of the objecting shareholders later withdrew their demand). The core idea here is that in the event of an activist
engagement the diversified shareholders could seek to block
private settlements (without their consent) if they filed a demand supported by a larger percentage of shares than the activists held. The filing of such a demand would effectively
assert that the activists did not represent the “silent majority”
of the shareholders. This bylaw would provide that it could
only be amended by shareholder action, but procedures could
be further specified in the bylaw so that these shareholders
could withdraw their demand if an acceptable compromise
were reached among the activists, the diversified shareholders,
and corporate management. In reality, such a shareholder demand would be intended to start a three-way negotiation between the activists, the “silent majority,” and management.
Inevitably, there are some legal issues here, but they can
be largely solved or outflanked.110 In any event, most corporate
110
First and foremost is the possibility that a shareholder-adopted bylaw may
be deemed invalid (at least in Delaware) if it fails to contain language or a provision reserving to the corporation’s directors their power to fulfill their fiduciary
duties and reach a private settlement in a specific case. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME
Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008) (determining that shareholder
approved bylaws may not usurp the board’s power to exercise its fiduciary duty).
Several answers are possible to this objection. First, language could be inserted
giving the board such power, but only after they fully consulted with the share-
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managements would find it difficult simply to rebuff or challenge such a demand. This demand procedure would give the
diversified investor community both flexibility and leverage, as
they could first meet with management and negotiate for their
own candidate or candidates to join the board, turning to the
demand procedure only if they were left unsatisfied. A perceptive corporate management might welcome (and even adopt)
such a bylaw because it would be a clear signal to activists that
they would encounter stiff resistance at such a company.111
This signal might deter some activist engagements, and that
may be an important virtue of this bylaw.
2.

Restricting Informed Trading

Information leakage can injure the corporation and its
shareholders in at least two ways: First, premature disclosure
may disable the corporation from exploiting opportunities or
solving business problems, which it could have done if it had
more time. The facts of the famous Texas Gulf Sulphur case
illustrate this problem, as heavy insider trading forced the
company to disclose its extraordinary ore strike before it could
buy the mineral rights on the land surrounding its test drill
holes.112 In other cases, misappropriated information may be
seized and exploited by others (including rival firms), again
injuring the corporation. Second, even if premature disclosure
does not injure the corporation, informed trading in the corpoholders filing the demand. Second, if corporate management sensibly realized
that such a provision insulated them, they could themselves amend the certificate
of incorporation to add the same provision (which would then no longer be subject
to such a legal challenge). Or, the board could amend the bylaws themselves
(which arguably should be effective). Even if the bylaw could not be fully enforced,
it could still have considerable impact on a corporation that did not want to offend
its “permanent shareholders.” A second problem is that the solicitation of shareholders to sign such a written demand might be deemed a solicitation subject to
the proxy rules. However, several exemptions from the proxy rules seem available
here. Rule 14a-2(b)(2) exempts solicitations “where the total number of persons
solicited is not more than ten.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(2) (2018). Less than ten
institutional investors could easily hold 7% or 8% of the issuer’s stock. Also,
those asking institutional investors to sign such a demand could claim the exemption afforded by Rule 14a-2(b)(1) because they would not be seeking proxy
authority. The bottom line is that the legal problems here can be solved.
111
Of course, one impact of such a bylaw or charter provision might be to
cause activists to directly approach the institutional investor community and
work out their proposal with them before approaching the company. But this is
desirable.
112
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
Essentially, this case held that the SEC could sue corporate managers who traded
after a major ore discovery but before its disclosure, but the company’s disclosure
of the strike, which was hastened by its managers’ trading, precluded it from fully
realizing all the gains from its discovery.
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ration’s stock causes its bid/ask spread to widen and this cost
falls on all shareholders. Indeed, even those shareholders who
do not trade bear it indirectly because it raises the cost of
capital to the corporation. Small as this cost may be in individual transactions, the aggregate cost across the market could be
large.
One response to the evidence earlier noted that informed
trading occurs regularly once activist nominees (and particularly activist employees) are appointed to the board is to say:
enforce the law! If this is unlawful, then arguably there should
be criminal prosecutions. But that response, while understandable, may be too simple. There are both legal uncertainties and enormous problems of proof in relying on criminal
sanctions or SEC civil enforcement. Prosecutorial resources
are limited and also subject to periodic reallocation. This Part
will briefly survey these problems and then turn to a proposed
rule change that would expand the definition of “group” under
the Williams Act, in part in order to simplify insider trading
enforcement.
1. Legal Uncertainties. Much trading by hedge funds who
are planning an engagement with a corporation appears to be
lawful. For example, assume that one activist hedge fund (the
Mars Fund) tells five other funds that it is planning to file a
Schedule 13-D in two weeks with respect to Widget Corp.,
which document would list its demands, including that Widget’s CEO be replaced. All parties to this communication understand that a significant stock market jump will follow the
filing of the Schedule 13-D (probably an abnormal return of 7%
or so). But those trading on this information do not violate U.S.
law, because they owe no fiduciary duty to Widget Corp. Similarly, if at a later point the Mars Fund approaches other activists to support it in its proxy campaign to add three directors to
the Widget board, the same conclusion follows: no fiduciary
duty is owed to Widget—hence no liability.
But the issues become more complex once Mars successfully appoints two directors to Widget’s board. Now, the directors do owe a fiduciary duty to Widget and any material,
nonpublic information that Mars receives from them (directly
or indirectly) makes Mars a potential tippee who is barred from
trading. Traditionally, from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Dirks v. SEC,113 to the Second Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Newman,114 it was necessary for the prosecution to
113
114

463 U.S. 646 (1983).
773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
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show that the tipper received some “personal benefit” from (or
on behalf of) the tippee. This burden could often be easily
satisfied as an evidentiary matter. For example, if Mars pays a
salary to its employees and asks them to sit on the Widget
board, this should suffice to constitute the requisite “personal
benefit.” Even if Mars pays nothing to outside experts it may
still have caused them to receive a director’s salary from Widget
and this too may suffice.
But suppose Mars does not trade Widget shares. Instead,
another hedge fund, Jupiter Fund, hears indirectly what the
Mars employee on the Widget board learned at the last board
meeting. Jupiter has paid nothing to the Mars’ employee, but it
arguably has received a gift of this information from an insider.
If so, Jupiter may have liability. But if the information now
leaks from Jupiter to other funds who do not know the origins
of the material information, this may be beyond the effective
reach of the SEC or the criminal justice system.
The prosecutor’s burden in proving insider trading has
been substantially simplified by a recent Second Circuit decision, United States v. Martoma,115 which finds that a “gift” of
information made by a tipper to any tippee violates the law,
even if no “benefit” is given by the tippee to the tipper, so long
as the tipper intends to benefit the tippee. Although this decision would still seemingly require that the recipient of the information know that the gift was given in breach of a fiduciary or
similar duty by the tipper, it does not require that there be any

115
869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017) amended and superseded by 894 F.3d 64 (2d
Cir. 2018). In its first Martoma decision, the panel majority gave the example of a
corporate insider who “instead of giving a cash end-of-year gift to his doorman,
gives a tip of inside information with instructions to trade on the information.”
Martoma, 869 F.3d at 70. The court added: “Thus, we hold that an insider or
tipper personally benefits from a disclosure of inside information whenever the
information was disclosed with the expectation that the recipient would trade on
it[.]” Id. (quotation omitted). In the context of one hedge fund (or an employee
thereof) tipping another, this test would seem to be easily satisfied unless there
was some credible reason to believe that the tippee would not trade. Then, in
June 2018, the Martoma panel substituted a revised decision (still split on the
same 2–1 basis), which changed the governing test. United States v. Martoma,
894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018). Now, the standard for whether an unlawful gift had
been made shifts from whether the tipper expected that the tippee would trade on
the information to whether the tipper intended to benefit the tippee. See id. at 83.
This change may be more semantic than substantive because a jury can easily
find that the tipper was “intending to benefit” even a casual friend. Also, the case
of a tip from an insider to his condo’s doorman at Christmas (which the first
Martoma decision said would violate Rule 10b-5) would now likely violate both the
personal benefit standard (because the insider escapes the need to make a pecuniary payment to the doorman) and the gift standard.
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“meaningful close relationship” between the tipper and the tippee (as other Circuits have required).116
Although the prosecutor’s burden has been simplified by
Martoma, it remains true that, as the chain of tippees lengthens, enforcement becomes more difficult and, eventually, impossible. At some point, remote tippees do not know the source
of the information or any facts suggesting a breach of duty.
Also, the director/tipper may have had legitimate reasons for
disclosing the information, first to the hedge fund employing
the tipper and possibly even to its allies. If so, this employee
has neither violated Rule 10b-5 nor aided and abetted anyone’s
trading violation—as, for example, in a case where the employee/director was intending only to discuss the next tactical
moves with the rest of the hedge fund’s management team. In
this light, we cannot safely conclude that the increased “leakiness” surrounding companies with hedge fund employees on
their boards necessarily implies that unlawful insider trading
has occurred. Nevertheless, the widened bid/ask spread is an
agency cost (as is the possibility that premature disclosure may
cost the company in other ways).
The relevant question thus raised is whether there is a
feasible way to reduce this agency cost. In our view, simple
means to this end are available, including, as we next discuss,
by expanding the concept of “group” under the Williams Act.
2. Redefining “Group”. A word of background is initially
necessary. A driving force behind hedge fund activism is the
ability of a “wolf pack” of like-minded investors to assemble
quickly to threaten (or undertake) a proxy campaign. If all the
members of the “wolf pack” were deemed to constitute a
“group” under Section 13(d)(3) of the Williams Act, the process
of “wolf pack” formation would need to slow, some current
members would likely refuse to join the group, and other share116
Newman had required a “meaningfully close personal relationship” to trigger the gift theory. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
Both Martoma decisions have disagreed, finding that the tippee need not have
such a relationship with the tipper. This change will certainly facilitate the prosecution of information exchanges among hedge funds or their employees. All the
prosecutor will need to show is that there was an intention to benefit on the part of
the tipper (or, under the personal benefit theory, that the tipper expected some
reciprocal benefit in return). Other circuits, however, may still require that there
be a “meaningfully close personal relationship.” See, e.g., United States v. Bray,
853 F.3d 18, 26–27 (1st Cir. 2017) (“good friends”); United States v. Parigian, 824
F.3d 5, 16 (1st Cir. 2016) (friendship and quid pro quo); SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d
1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (“a friend and frequent partner in real estate deals”).
Even if other Circuits do continue to require some form of “meaningfully close
personal relationship,” this is not a high standard (and it may have existed between the tipper and the tippee on the facts of Martoma).
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holders could enter the negotiations with the issuer to suggest
other board candidates. On the face of the SEC’s rules under
the Williams Act, courts could find in many cases that an informal association of activist investors was a “group,”117 but recent judicial decisions have defined “group” narrowly, refusing
to treat activist investors who were discussing parallel action to
constitute a group.118 Even a joint slate of directors proposed
by the same investors has not sufficed to convince at least one
court to deem this association of investors a “group.”119 Curiously, earlier decisions had found a “group” whenever investors
“reached an understanding to act in concert.”120 What explains this judicial shift? Possibly, some recent courts have
been reluctant to change the balance of advantage in a takeover battle and did not wish to enjoin a lucrative tender offer
over an arguably minor disclosure violation.
Today, however, the issue is not whether courts should
block a tender offer because of a possible disclosure shortcoming, but whether an activist-led minority of the shares can
assemble a block without disclosure and thereby preempt the
preferences of the more passive majority. In such a context,
courts should be more sensitive to the likelihood that persons
acting in concert have not had to disclose their identities,
plans, and stock positions at the time they begin to pressure
the board. For example, assume that these hedge funds, each
owning 3% of the target’s stock, decide to pressure the target to
increase its financial leverage and spin off a third of its assets.
If their decision to act in concert made them a group, they
would be required to file a joint Schedule 13-D, acknowledging
117
Particular attention needs to be given here to Rule 13d-5(b)(1) (“Acquisition
of securities”), which provides as follows:
When two or more persons agree to act together for the purpose of
acquiring, holding, voting, or disposing of equity securities of an
issuer, the group formed thereby shall be deemed to have acquired
beneficial ownership, for purposes of Sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the
Act, as of the date of such agreement, of all equity securities of that
issuer beneficially owned by any such persons.
17 C.F.R. 240.13d-5(b)(1) (2018). This rule recognizes the possibility of a “voting
group”—persons who have agreed to act together, for example, to elect one or
more directors.
118
See Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613 (2d Cir.
2002).
119
See meVC Draper Fisher Jurvetson Fund I, Inc. v. Millennium Partners,
260 F. Supp. 2d 616, 631–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
120
See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 363 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding
that concerted action need not be expressly memorialized in writing to support a
finding of a “group”); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971)
(finding that four shareholders who together owned 10.25% of outstanding shares
and agreed to pool their shares constituted a “group”).
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that they were a group and disclosing their plans. But if they
can avoid becoming a “group” simply by declaring that they all
planned to act independently, then a Schedule 13-D filing
would not be required until one of the three crossed the five
percent threshold of Section 13(d).
This timing difference is important because earlier notice
would give a greater opportunity for other investors (such as
SSGA and other diversified institutional investors) to organize
and participate in the negotiations with the issuer. In contrast,
in the takeover context, earlier notice only gave the target more
time to activate its defenses or seek a white knight.
Even under the narrow view of “group” used by more recent
judicial decisions, there is far more reason to find that a
“group” exists when the activists are planning (or threatening)
a proxy contest. Proxy contests, by definition, require collective
action. In contrast, those who simply buy a target’s stock in
the hopes that there will be a future takeover bid are not acting
collectively (even if they regularly communicate). Thus, those
who discuss the possibility of asking management to appoint
their nominees to the board (with the inherent threat in the
background that they will start a proxy contest if rebuffed)
seem more properly considered a “group” than those investors
who simply purchase the stock and hope that there will be a
takeover bid. Put simply, because the former need to act collectively to succeed, they are more appropriately deemed a
“group.”
Nonetheless, the narrow definition of “group” in recent
cases poses a problem. The best answer to this problem would
be a new SEC rule, defining the term “group” in the context of
hedge fund activism. One possible articulation of such an expanded rule would define a “group” to include:
Any association in fact of persons or entities, formal or informal, that is seeking to appoint directors to the corporation’s
board, whether through private negotiations or a proxy contest, which was formed prior to the public disclosure of the
campaign or effort, including any person who has received
information or plans, directly or indirectly, with respect to
this effort from another group member (or any employee or
agent thereof) and who subsequently purchased stock of
such corporation prior to such public disclosure.121
121
Thus, any person or entity contacted by the lead activist prior to the filing
of its Schedule 13-D would be deemed a member of this group, if it purchased any
shares in the target after that point. No formal acceptance (nor any formal rejection) would count if there were share purchases by the putative group member
after this tip and before public disclosure.
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This “group” would include all shareholders who purchased the issuer’s stock after receiving such a private tip from
any other group member. This standard accomplishes two
things at once: first, it would exclude the public shareholder
who only learns from press reports or news media that activists
are seeking to advance a slate of board nominees. Such people,
even if they strongly support the slate, were not part of the
group that organized the campaign. Second, this standard
places considerable weight on the private tipping of information
by an activist to its allies; this is what fuels the “wolf pack” and
thus should define the group. Tips do not occur randomly;
they are made to those whose support and loyalty is sought.
When the lead activist tells other hedge funds (or other activists) that it is planning to file a Schedule 13-D next week with
respect to Widget Corp., this is not idle gossip. Rather, this is
an informal invitation to join the “group,” and the law should so
recognize.
If those who receive such a tip and then purchase the
target’s stock were deemed to be members of a Section 13(d)
group, the consequence of using the fact of a tip from one
activist to another as evidence of a group’s formation would be
that the existence of the “wolf pack” would have to be disclosed
at a much earlier stage. Presumably, the Schedule 13-D would
have to be amended as each additional member “joined” the
“wolf pack.” This idea has at least occurred to the SEC.122
Some investors would not want to join the “group” (possibly for
fear of liability), but this would only mean that they could not
buy the target’s shares (at least prior to the public disclosure of
the “group” on the filing of the Schedule 13-D). Also, any
poison pill that the target’s board adopts in response to this
disclosure would likely restrict all the “group” members, holding them to their current disclosed stake. In short, the “wolf
pack” could less easily grow to the size it has reached in some
recent cases. Any proxy contest would likely be a closer battle
122
The SEC has recently begun to suggest that collaborative sharing by the
hedge funds of information about a campaign aimed at a specific target could
“cross the line” and result in the formation of a “group.” See Perrie Michael
Weiner & Patrick Hunnius, Activist Investors—Brace Yourselves for 13D Changes,
LAW360 (Apr. 17, 2014, 10:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/529294/
activist-investors-brace-yourself-for-13d-changes [https://perma.cc/S3P4KWPK]; Liz Hoffman, Aruna Viswanatha & David Benoit, SEC Probes Activist
Funds over Whether They Secretly Acted in Concert, WALL ST. J. (June 4, 2015,
4:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-probes-activist-funds-overwhether-they-secretly-acted-in-concert-1433451205 [https://perma.cc/FHL6FXEC].
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and other shareholders might petition the board to support
their nominees instead.
Is there any chance that the SEC would adopt such an
expanded definition of “group”? It fits easily within the statutory language and it is consistent with the existing rules, but in
recent years the SEC has stood mutely on the sidelines in the
battles between companies and the activists engaging them.
This neutrality may have been in part the product of the SEC’s
knowledge that it would take much criticism from either the
corporate community or the institutional investor community if
it sided with the other. But there is now evidence that activism
is associated with informed trading, a traditional focus of SEC
enforcement. Also, the debate over activist tactics is no longer
simply a two-sided battle between activist funds and target
managements, as the institutional investor community is itself
divided (with activists on one side and the “permanent” shareholder community—i.e., BlackRock, SSGA and Vanguard—on
the other). By ignoring the “wolf pack,” the SEC is increasingly
playing the ostrich and rendering itself irrelevant.
3. Disclosure About Confidentiality Restrictions. In our data
set, the majority of the settlement agreements did not set forth
any provision regarding the sharing of the information learned
by the hedge fund’s nominees at board meetings, while other
settlement agreements only referred to a separate confidentiality agreement whose terms were not disclosed.123 Yet our data
also shows that the market responds much more positively to
the announcement of a settlement agreement with an explicit
restriction on information sharing.124 This suggests that such
information is material to investors.125 Hence, given the frequency with which such settlement agreements are filed, the
SEC could indicate that it wants greater disclosure (whether in
the Form 8-K or in a press release) about the handling of confidential information acquired by the new fund-nominated
directors.
123

See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
See supra Table 9. The five-day CAR was 2.25% for settlement agreements
with a restriction on information sharing versus 0.42% for those without such a
restriction. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
125
Beginning with TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976),
the Supreme Court has consistently defined “materiality” by finding that: “An
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” Id. at 439.
When the omission of any reference to a confidentiality provision seems to move
the market across a wide range of cases (as our data shows), that omission is
material.
124
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This need for fuller disclosure stems in part from the fact
that slates of directors sponsored by a hedge fund is both a new
phenomenon and a rapidly growing one. Also, under Regulation FD, the issuer may not selectively disclose material information to a hedge fund, unless it has obtained a confidentiality
agreement.126 All these factors support the case for requiring
disclosure of the presence or absence of a confidentiality provision and its terms.
3.

Impact and Possible Rebuttals

The proposals made here will not stop or cripple hedge
fund activism. Nor is that their intent. Still, they should reduce tipping and informed trading, and they would authorize
the other shareholders to take self-help measures. These are
modest goals that reduce the agency costs associated with
hedge fund activism. They increase transparency and shareholder rights, but they do not chill activism.
Nonetheless, we anticipate rebuttals from the proponents
of activism. They may argue that the losses from widened
spreads and informed trading are small in relation to the gains
from activism. Two serious problems surround such an argument: First, the gains from activism are in dispute, and the
existing empirical studies prove only that there is a positive
stock price reaction at the time the activists file their original
Schedule 13-D announcing their position and later if there is a
“successful outcome.”127 Absent a successful outcome (such
as a takeover or acquisition of the target), stock prices tend not
to rise further.128 Second and more important, this justification that the gains exceed the losses is an unfortunate example
of an “end-justifies-the-means” argument, which should be
viewed skeptically, particularly when the conduct is unlawful.
The evidence collected in this Article strongly implies that informed trading is systematically occurring after the appointment of fund-nominated directors, and in light of the recent
case law, this behavior is likely to be unlawful if the tipper is
126
Under Rule 100(b)(2) of Regulation FD, the prohibition against selective
disclosure in Rule 100(a) does not apply to a disclosure “[t]o a person who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information in confidence.” See 17 C.F.R.
§243.100(b)(2)(ii) (2018).
127
See discussion at supra note 1; see also Becht et al., supra note 100, at 31
(reporting results from a large international survey and concluding that the
“[s]uccess of the activist business model appears to crucially depend on the activist achieving outcomes.” In other words, the appointment of activist directors
does not alone create value.).
128
See Becht et al., supra note 100, at 28–31 (activist engagements without a
successful outcome do not create shareholder value).
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seeking to benefit the tippee.129 To suggest that this behavior
should be ignored to facilitate activism is to suggest that pervasive criminal conduct is tolerable if it is profitable. The modern
history of Wall Street provides ample evidence that once the
rules are recurrently bent or ignored, full scale corruption soon
follows.130
A more modest variant on this initial claim that information sharing leads to greater benefits than costs is the narrower
claim that information sharing does not violate the director’s
duty of confidentiality under Delaware Law.131 To a degree,
this may be true, and a respected Delaware Vice Chancellor
has argued in a well-known law review article that fund-nominated directors may share confidential information with the
activist fund that nominated them.132 But even this Article,
which reads the somewhat ambiguous precedents very permissively, recognizes that the sharing must stop there and the
activist fund cannot then share with others.133 We would go
further and argue that the director may only share confidential
information with the activist fund if the director reasonably
believes that adequate restrictions are in place at the fund to
ensure confidentiality. As our study shows, such formal policies are uncommon.134 Moreover, unlike private equity firms
(which hold stakes in unlisted companies whose securities
cannot be traded), the activist fund lives in an environment
where many will be seeking confidential information from it.
Absent strong policies and internal controls, the result of allowing directors to share with the fund that employs them may
be continued informed trading. In such an environment, a
129
See supra notes 102, 110, 111 and accompanying text (discussing United
States v. Martoma, under which even gifts of information to casual friends or
acquaintances can seemingly be prosecuted if there is an intent to benefit the
tippee).
130
This is also the theme of “Junk,” a play by Ayad Akhtar, a Pulitzer Prizewinning dramatist, which focuses on the M&A world of the 1980’s and seems
loosely based on the career of Michael Milken. Terry Teachout, ‘Junk’ Review:
Bankrupting Entertainment, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2017, 8:30 PM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/junk-review-bankrupting-entertainment-1509669000
[https://perma.cc/YEW3-78BJ].
131
Delaware has long recognized that the director owes a duty of confidentiality. See Henshaw v. Am. Cement Corp., 252 A.2d 125, 129 (Del. Ch. 1969).
132
See Laster & Zeberkiewicz, supra note 43, at 50.
133
Id. at 55 (“The corporation can also require the director’s affiliate to enter
into a confidentiality agreement that restricts the use or further dissemination of
the information.”).
134
See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (finding that few corporations in our data set appeared to impose meaningful restrictions). This failure
may be, of course, in part a product of management’s limited leverage with respect
to powerful activists and strong risk aversion.
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director cannot assume confidentiality. Sharing of confidential
information by the director with the hedge fund that nominated
it should be permissible only when the director has first taken
steps to assure himself or herself that adequate policies are in
place to assure confidentiality.
CONCLUSION
Informed trading is closely associated with hedge fund activism, but the mechanism underlying information leakage is
unclear. It is far too cynical to conclude that everyone does it.
Most do not. Our most striking finding is that there is a radical
difference in behavior between fund-nominated directors who
are business executives and those who are hedge fund employees. Different norms and moralities (or, at least, different opportunities) appear to separate these two populations. Once a
hedge fund employee goes on the board, informed trading is the
norm, not the exception. We do not argue that all activist funds
are alike or that they all engage in such behavior; nor do we
assert that activist funds (or their employees) are trading on
insider information. It is possible that some tipping is a cynical
exchange of a tip for an expected reciprocal favor in the future.
But it is also possible that the more common phenomenon is
simply casual gossip among professionals in close contact. At
a minimum, we are convinced that the informational partitions, if any, between the activist fund and its allies tend to be
porous.
In turn, this implies both that an agency cost is imposed on
the other shareholders and that activism is receiving a subsidy
in the form of pervasive access to material, nonpublic information. We do not claim that this subsidy alone fuels hedge fund
activism, but it likely does inflate the number of engagements
and may make otherwise economically marginal hedge fund
interventions profitable.
What reforms are justified? One might hope that sunlight
is the best disinfectant and thus that the mere announcement
of our findings would lead activists both toward preferring
outside experts to their own employees as proposed directors
and into installing stronger controls protecting confidentiality.
Nice as it may be to think so, we are not optimistic that reform
will follow automatically from the announcement of our findings. In part, this is because the fund’s nominated employee is
often the fund’s founder, and in part, it is because the activist
fund may need to reward its allies in order to maintain its
coalition and thus its leverage for any approaching proxy fight.
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Because we find the dominant pattern to be that the hedge
fund and the target company do not specify any confidentiality
restrictions on the information acquired by the fund’s director
nominees, we think this might be the first area for the SEC to
address. Encouraging stronger confidentiality provisions in
settlement agreements (and disclosing their absence) might
curb the ease with which private information seems to flow.
Our proposed reforms will hardly cripple hedge fund activism, but they could reduce a perverse subsidy. We recognize
that activist funds should be able to reap the gains if the stock
prices of their target firms rise after their intervention, but not
if prices fall or just fluctuate erratically. We anticipate that our
reforms will face resistance, but we see no sound justification
for tolerating pervasive information leakage.
Finally, our findings supply a road map for regulators. To
date, the prosecution of insider trading has proceeded on an ad
hoc, case-by-case basis that is dependent upon enforcers fortuitously stumbling upon a violation (often as the result of
whistleblowers or plea bargains with third parties who are rewarded for confessing as to other violations). But, using our
approach, regulators could identify suspicious patterns of information leakage and then could turn to the options market to
learn who was trading. That would substitute rational search
for happenstance.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
EMPIRICAL APPENDIX
In Appendix Figure 1, the x-axis is the number of days
between the director’s appointment date and the Form 8-K filing. This normalization by the “time difference” allows for plotting leakage for Form 8-K filings from different points in time
on the same figure. We average the leakage by treatment and
control group for each “time difference” and apply
nonparametric smoothing piecewise to the pre- and post- periods for each group.
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1. PARALLEL TRENDS. This Figure plots pre and
post-time trends on the leakage outcome for the treatment and
control groups (chosen by propensity score matching). The xaxis is the number of days between the director appointment
date and the Form 8-K filing. This normalization by the “time
difference” allows for plotting leakage for Form 8-K filings from
different points in time on the same figure. We average the
leakage by treatment and control group for each “time
difference” and apply piecewise nonparametric kernel
regression to the pre- and post- periods for each group. The
treatment group is plotted with a solid line, while the control
group is plotted with a dotted line in the Figure below.
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As Appendix Figure 1 shows, trends in leakage over time for
our treatment and control groups are parallel prior to the date
of the activist director. We observe a shift in those trends only
after the appointment of the activist director.
THEORETICAL APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we explain why, strictly as a theoretical
matter, activist investors and target boards might pursue settlement agreements that facilitate access to, and trading upon,
material nonpublic information. We show that expected profits
from insider trading induce lower-quality activists to engage in
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intervention campaigns than otherwise would, and that the
social costs of such informed trading imply a divergence between the private and socially optimal level of activist quality.
We begin with the framework in Burkart and Lee, which
considers the payoffs to activism.135 In their model, the activist’s campaign succeeds with probability q(ea) ∝ saqaea, where
sa ∈ (0,1) is the proportion of shares the activist holds at the
conclusion of the campaign, qa ≥ 0 denotes the activist’s ability,
ea ≥ 0 denotes her effort.2 Firm value after a successful activist
campaign is given by V(ea) = q(ea)pm, i.e., increasing in the
probability of success. The activist incurs an effort cost given
by:

Although for concision we omit the technical assumptions
set out in Burkart and Lee, we briefly restate the sequence of
the game they consider. The activist begins with a “toehold”
investment in the company, ta ∈ (0,1) fraction of shares. At t = 3, the activist purchases ra shares at the open-market price pa.
At t = −2, the activist chooses whether to engage in an intervention, and if so, what effort level ea to expend. At t = −1, upon the
successful sale of the firm, the activist receives saV(ea), i.e., her
share of the value of the firm, which is a function of the effort
exerted at t = −2.
Like Burkart and Lee, we require that pa ≥ V (ea), i.e., the
activist is unable to acquire shares on the open market at a
price lower than the ex-post expected value, which is essentially the free-rider problem identified in Grossman and Hart.3
We also impose the incentive constraint that saV’(ea) = K’(ea),
i.e., the activist will optimally expend effort until marginal cost
is equal to marginal gains.
Next, we augment Burkart and Lee by assuming that the
activist also receives a payoff equal to the expected value of
engaging in illegal insider trading on the basis of information
obtained through access to the corporate boardroom after a
1
Following Burkart and Lee, we adopt the simplifying assumption that the
activist seeks to intervene in order to sell the firm to a third-party bidder. See
Mike Burkart and Samuel Lee, Activism and Takeovers, https://papers.SSRN.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2585836 [https://perma.cc/ARL8-DNQ8].
2
Unlike Burkart and Lee, we do not explicitly parameterize voting rights and
implicitly embrace a rule of one-share, one-vote.
3
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980). One motivation
for this constraint is that, as noted above, federal law mandates disclosure when
block holders, including activist shareholders, exceed 5% ownership.
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settlement agreement. We adopt the notation used in McCrary,4 which implies that the activist’s problem is given by:
Subject to: max saV(ea) − K(ea) − rapa + Et[V(Bt+1)]
pa ≥ V(ea)
saV’(ea) = K’(ea)
sa = ta + ra
The term Et[V(Bt+1)] refers to the expected value of the future
benefit of insider trading from boardroom access in the dynamic recursive model of McCrary. For present purposes, we
consider the simple case where the expected utility from engaging in insider trading is independent of the number of shares
acquired. In that case, the solution to the optimization problem is unaffected and the result in Burkart and Lee applies:
. And, as in their model, there exists a unique qa such
that the activist will engage in the intervention if and only if her
qa ≥ qa. But we expect qa to decrease with Et[V(Bt+1)]: that is, that
as insider-trading profits rise, the activist ability necessary to
justify an intervention falls.5
Now, let’s consider more carefully the term Et[V(Bt+1)], or the
expected value of future gains from insider trading, following
McCrary. In that model, the activist is presented each period
with a (random) benefit of insider trading, denoted by Bt+1,
which has c.d.f. F(.). Apprehension occurs with probability pt+1.
For now, we adopt the simplifying assumption that the penalty
for insider trading is a single-period punishment c, which is
deterministic and constant over time. In each period, the activist is presented with the opportunity Bt+1. If she chooses to
commit the crime and is not apprehended, she receives the
expected payoff dEt[V(Bt+2)] + Bt+1, where d is the discount factor.
If apprehended, she receives the expected payoff dEt[V(Bt+2)] − c.
If she does not engage in crime, she receives the flow utility
dEt[V(Bt+2)]. The director’s problem is to maximize the recursive
value function:
V(Bt+1) = max{dEt[V(Bt+2)], pt(dEt[V(Bt+2)] − c) + (1 − pt) (dEt[V(Bt+2)] +
Bt+1])}.

4

Justin McCrary, Dynamic Perspectives on Crime, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECOCRIME (Bruce L. Benson & Paul R. Zimmerman, eds. 2010).
The optimal effort is easily calculated (see Burkart and Lee supra note 1) as

NOMICS OF
5

, implying that the activist’s expected profit is given by:
. For this
expression to be positive, a larger Et[V(Bt+1)] admits a smaller value of qa.
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such
The solution is obtained via a “reservation benefit”
, the director facilitates insider trading,
that for any
and otherwise does not.6 Straightforward substitution yields
Et[VCBt+1)] = 8Et[VCBt+2)] + (1- F(b;+1))(l - Trt+1)Et[Bt+1 h;+1 IBt+1 - h;+1 > 0],
b*

_

1rt+l

C

and the reservation benefit is given by t+l - 1-7rt+l , which is
very similar to the result found in the static Becker model.7
We derive the optimal stopping time for the facilitation of
illicit trading. Suppose that Bt+1] is uniformly distributed over
the interval [0, 1] and the probability of detection is given by a
standard logistic function of the square root of time:
1
Trt=-----

1 + exp(-vt)

It is plausible to assume that the probability of detection
increases with time because it is easier for prosecutors to detect and establish illegal insider trading as the number of
trades and abnormal profit increases. It might seem that the
probability of detection does not necessarily increase with time,
but rather with the number of trades; however, in this simplified model, it is a reasonable approximation, as the agent either
“trades or not” and the periods of no-trading do not decrease
the probability of detection. With these assumptions, it is
straightforward to substitute:
1
bt* = c 1 + exp(-vt) = c exp (vr=)
t
1
1 - --------,,,,,...1 + exp(-vt)
which allows for a straightforward determination of a maximum stopping time T such that for any t>r, we have that
Pr(B, > b;) = 0. Suppose, for example, that the punishment c =
at
.
0.1. Then b; > 1 and
However, it is generally better for the director to stop before
this time T . Substituting h; = c exp(✓t) in the value function

c evt) > 0 (of course, for
c evt) = 0, we have that

yields, for any period t :5 r where F ( 1 any

period t>T where F ( 1 8
Et[VCBt+l)] = 0):

6
See McCrary, supra note 4, for a straightforward derivation of this recursive expected value. We normalize the flow utility to zero, assuming that the
activist’s profit is given entirely by the benefit Bt+1.
7
Gary Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1063 (1974).
8
Recall that F(Bt+1) = Bt+1 in this simple setting.
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, which leads to:

.!_ 2

Ce .JE+i

Note that the second term is approximately the derivative
of the cumulative value function with respect to time. For
o : : : 1, the optimal stopping time is simply the first-order
condition:
1 - cevr = 0
-

=

2

r*

= [ln2c]2

In general, it will be the case that Consider, again, the
example where c = 0.1 , which yields an optimal stopping time
of t* ≡ 2.59. Letting d = 0.99, the cumulative expected value for
the upcoming time period is given by:
Time Period
t=1
t=2
t=3
t=4
t=5

 ሾሺା ሻሿ
0.05952391
0.07584117
0.06689266
0.04168107
0.005558258

ૈܜ
0.73
0.80
0.84
0.88
0.90

APPENDIX TABLE 1: EXPECTED PAYOFF BY STOPPING TIME
As the Appendix Table 1 shows, the activist’s expected payoff is indeed maximized by stopping at t = 2 rather than t = 5.
That is: consistent with the empirical findings described in
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subpart II.A, an activist director may be better off facilitating
trading for shorter rather than longer periods of time.
Moreover, Et[V(Bt+1)] at t = 0 will be positive only if the stopping time is chosen correctly. Assuming that the director can
facilitate profitable insider trading, then, yields a smaller value
of qa in the Burkart and Lee model—that is, permits lowerquality activists to intervene in public company governance
than otherwise would.
It might be tempting to conclude that such conduct,
whether or not legally sanctioned, is likely to be social welfareenhancing. Indeed, in the Burkurt and Lee model, social welfare would seem to be strictly enhanced by greater activist participation regardless of activist ability, because firm value, V(ea)
= saqaeapm, is strictly increasing in qa. On this view, the director’s access to insider trading opportunities essentially serve as
a subsidy for more value-enhancing activism (or, if one prefers,
compensation for the activist’s socially valuable work). But it
does not necessarily follow that the private optimum is identical to the social optimum because of an externality of the insider trading: wider bid-ask spreads.
Glosten and Putnins argue that informed trading generates
welfare losses by leading to wider bid-ask spreads.9 One way to
formalize this idea is to suppose that the social cost of informed
trading can be represented as a function of t, the number of
periods that the activist director facilitates insider trading. In
Glosten and Putnins, wider bid-ask spreads impose a social
cost by preventing some mutually beneficial transactions from
taking place—a cost society incurs in each period in which the
insider trades. To see the divergence between the private and
social optimum, recall that the expected value of an activist
intervention, which we denote as is given as follows, substituting the recursive payoff from insider trading as of time t = 0:
27
E[fl(0a, r)] = 0J 32 k tdP~ -

r-1

k+L

E._ 4 2
E[fl(0a, r)] - 0a 32 k taPm
_

2

~

t=O

_

8Et[VCBt+2)]
r-l

+
t
_ ~0
k

(1 +

+

.!2 -

cevt+l
1 + evt+l

--ce vt+l)
2

1

evt+l

As noted previously, there generally exists a t* that maximizes the last term at a positive value (unless the punishment c
9
Lawrence R. Glosten & Talis J. Putnins, The Welfare Costs of Informed
Trade, AM. ECON. ASS’N, https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2016/retrieve.
php? pdfid=808 [https://perma.cc/HF2P-2JZG].
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for insider trading is so great that an activist will not engage in
it at all). And as a result, the minimum quality level qa such
that for any qa > qa, E[P(qa,t)] ≥ 0, is lower than in the absence of
insider trading opportunities.
Letting lt denote the average, per-activist social cost imposed by insider trading through the stopping time t, the social
planner’s objective function is given by:
_

2

.E_

4

2 _

E[I1social(0a, r)] - 0a 32k taPm

k

-

T-1[ 0

+~

t

(1 +

,/t+l_)l -

--ce
2
1 evt+l-

,h

And by applying the same approximation as in the prior
Subsection, the first-order condition with respect to t is given
by:
1 - ce j.-;ocial
2

1 _
-/l -

1

r;ocial

= ln

[zc - A]

0
2

*
It is straightforward to see that t Social
< t* for all c > 0. As
the expected value of insider trading increases with t, there
exists a range of values of qa for which it is privately, but not
socially optimal to engage in activism, i.e., E[P(qa,t)] > 0 but
E[PSocial(qa,t)] < 0. In Appendix Figure 1, we plot E[P(qa,t)] and
E[PSocial(qa,t)] as a function of qa at the optimal stopping times t*
and qSocial, respectively, and show the divergence between the
socially and privately optimal levels of activist quality.10
In sum, we theorize that the payoffs to shareholder activism can include profits related to directors’ facilitation of trading on material nonpublic information, and that directors can
recursively determine the optimal amount of such activity in
light of the probability of detection. Those profits, in turn, decrease the level of activist quality necessary to justify the marginally viable activist intervention. And, while such profits
might reflect compensation for socially productive activism in
the style of Manne (1965), since the trading that produces
those profits can result in widened bid-ask spreads, and since
the costs related to widening spreads are not internalized by
10
In Figure 1, for simplicity parameter values are set at c = 0.1, ta = 0.1, pm =
1, k = 3, k = 1, and l = 4. The example in the Figure is solely for illustrative
purposes; the actual divergence, if any, between the social and private optimum
depends on the range of these parameters.
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the activist,11 there is the potential for a divergence in the
socially and privately optimal level of activist quality.
APPENDIX FIGURE 1. PRIVATELY OPTIMAL VS. SOCIALLY OPTIMAL
ACTIVIST QUALITY RANGE. This figure shows the range of the
activist quality parameter qa and the resulting expected value
to activism, after choosing the optimal stopping time t* as
described in subpart II.B, for the private vs. socially optimal
maximization problems. The two expected-value calculations
are given by:

!:!.._ 4 2 _
E[ll(0a, r)] - 0a 32 k taPm
_

_

k
-

2

2

!:!.._

4

2 _

E[llsocial(0a, r)] - 0a 32k taPm

k

-

T-1

(1

,/t+l_)

(1 +

,/t+l_)l -

- - ce

+ ~ 0 t 21 + e,Jt+i_

[
+ T-1
~ 8t

- - ce
2
1 e,Jt+i_

Ar

Other parameters are set at c = 0.1, ta = 0.1, pm = 1, k = 3, k
= 1, and l = 4. The red shaded region shows the range of
activist quality parameter qa that yield a positive expected value
of activism for the activist but a negative expected value to the
social planner.

11
Of course, to the extent that the activist seeks to liquidate their position,
the bid-ask spread might be relevant to the activist’s private costs (Though we
note in this respect that, unlike many shareholders, activists often prefer control
to liquidity (compare John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991) (finding institutional
investors prefer liquidity to control), with Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge
Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021
(2007) (finding that hedge funds’ intense activism necessitates less diversification
and liquidity than institutional investors)). More importantly for present purposes, however, even these privately internalized costs to the activist are unlikely
to be equal to the costs to the investing public imposed by widened bid-ask
spreads. Our claim is not that the activist internalizes zero costs of the trading
activity, but only that the activist does not internalize all the costs of that activity.
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